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I.  Introduction.
Much of economic analysis – from the theory of the firm, to labor economics, to finance –
is based on the idea that individuals and firms can use enforceable contracts to improve their well-
being.  Such key results as the Fundamental Welfare Theorems (Arrow and Hahn 1971) and the
Coase Theorem (Coase 1960) show that welfare-improving contracting can achieve perfect
efficiency.  More recently, economists have recognized the limitations of the contracting process,
such as asymmetric information (Stiglitz 2000), free-riding (Olson 1965), and “describability” of
various contingencies (Grossman and Hart 1986).  Yet even this literature focuses on the problems
of negotiating contracts and takes their enforcement as free and perfect.
In economic analysis, the institution that enforces contracts both perfectly and freely is the
courts.  This theoretical view of perfect enforcement contrasts sharply with the empirical observation
that courts are often slow, inefficient, and even corrupt.  It is the enforcement of contracts by courts,
rather than the negotiation of contracts, that often limits Pareto-improving trade (Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff 2002).  Indeed, informal contract enforcement appears as a solution to court failures
(Macaulay 1963, Galanter 1981, Ellickson 1991).
In this paper, we attempt to understand in more detail how simple disputes are resolved in
courts.  We do so in a comparative study of how a plaintiff can use the official court system to evict
a non-paying tenant and to collect a bounced check in 109 countries around the world.  We measure
some of the key structural aspects of the operation of courts and examine their consequences for the
quality of formal dispute resolution.
The focus on courts is crucial.  For many corporations and sophisticated traders, alternative
methods of dispute resolution substitute for courts.  Likewise, many less wealthy individuals often4
resolve disputes privately, using neighbors, shamans, or violence.  Nonetheless, we believe that a
well functioning system of public dispute resolution, particularly for ordinary people, is an essential
element of justice. The Enlightenment idea was precisely to make courts accessible to ordinary
citizens, thereby securing justice and avoiding privatization of enforcement.  If ordinary people fail
to find justice in state courts, their likely alternative is not some efficient method of private dispute
resolution, but rather violence or acceptance of injustice.  
In a theoretical model of an ideal court, a dispute between two neighbors can be resolved by
a third on fairness grounds, with little knowledge or use of law, no lawyers, no written submissions,
no procedural constraints on how evidence, witnesses, and arguments are presented, and no appeal
(Shapiro 1981). Yet in reality, most legal systems heavily regulate dispute resolution: they rely on
lawyers and professional judges, regiment the steps that the disputants must follow, regulate the
collection and presentation of the evidence, insist on legal justification of claims and judges’
decisions, give predominance to written submissions, and so on.  Such regulations, which we call
procedural formalism or formalism for short, can have profound consequences for the quality of
dispute resolution, particularly in simple disputes material to an average person.  For this reason, we
focus on measuring and assessing the consequences of formalism of the legal procedure.
There are several important reasons why procedural formalism exists, some good and some
bad. The sovereign often has an interest in how the dispute is resolved, to punish undesirable
conduct, to establish precedents, or to promote deterrence, but also to help his friends and hurt his
enemies. Formalism, like all regulation, gives the sovereign more control over the outcomes relative
to the informality of the neighbor model.  And like all regulation, it can be used both to enhance
public welfare and to facilitate sovereign abuse of the public.  Informal justice may also be subject5
to various kinds of subversion: one neighbor may be more powerful than the other, and therefore able
to influence the judge.  Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) argue that regulation of dispute resolution can
be used to limit subversion.  Likewise, formalism may protect weak members of the community from
judicial and prosecutorial abuse, ensuring fairness and accuracy of the process.  As the great German
jurist Rudolf von Jhering exclaimed, “form is the sworn enemy of arbitrary rule, the twin sister of
liberty” (1898, p. 471).  Yet the potential benefits of formalism may come at a heavy cost in terms
of delay of adjudication, and the consequent reluctance of disputants to use the legal system. 
Moreover, it remains a wide-open question of how much justice formalism really buys.
We have three broad goals.  First, we aim to measure the formalism of the court procedure
around the world.  Second, we examine empirically the consequences of formalism for the quality
of the judicial system.  We examine both the expected duration of dispute resolution and such crucial
measures of its quality as access to justice, fairness, impartiality, consistency, and honesty.  Although
we do not have a direct measure of accuracy of dispute resolution, the measures of consistency and
fairness come relatively close.  At least for simple disputes, this analysis enables us to ask whether
formalism secures justice.  Third, we attempt to interpret the evidence in light of alternative theories
of institutions.  Specifically, we consider the possibility that the transplantation of Western legal
procedures to developing countries may have led to undesirably high levels of formalism.
2
                                                          
2 One additional goal we pursue is to examine other determinants of judicial quality, such as the incentives of judges
and regulators.  Proper incentives and controls, such as mandatory time limits on judges and proper compensation
systems for attorneys, have been said to improve quality (Messick 1999).   We do not find much evidence for the
proposition that these factors effect judicial quality; we summarize our findings in Section V.  
To pursue these goals, in cooperation with Lex Mundi, the largest international association
of law firms, we describe the exact procedures used to resolve two specific disputes in 109 countries.6
These are the eviction of a residential tenant for non-payment of rent and the collection of a check
returned for non-payment.  We described the cases to a law firm in each country in great detail, and
asked for a complete write-up of the legal procedures necessary to dispute these cases in court and
the exact articles of the law governing these procedures. For comparability, the cases were specified
so that the plaintiff has fully complied with the agreement (is 100% right), and the defendant has no
justification at all.  We also assumed in both cases that the defendant presents a poorly justified
opposition (so default judgment is not an option) and avoids voluntary payment.  To understand how
courts work, we also specified that the case does not settle, and proceeds through the system until
the ultimate judgment and its enforcement.
The focus on these two specific disputes has a number of advantages.  First, they represent
typical situations of default on an everyday contract in virtually every country.  The adjudication of
such cases illustrates the enforcement of property rights and private contracts in a given legal
environment.  Second, the case facts and procedural assumptions could be tailored to make the cases
comparable across countries.  This makes these cases distinct from other situations, such as divorce,
in which cross-country comparability is much harder to achieve.  Third, the resolution of these cases
involves lower level civil trial courts in all countries (unless Alternative Dispute Resolution is used).
Because these are the courts whose functioning is most relevant to many of a country’s citizens, the
focus on the quality of such courts is appropriate in a development context.  Fourth, we focus on
simple disputes resolved in lower level courts.  For more complex disputes, additional issues arise,
and it may not be appropriate to generalize our findings. For example, alternatives to the judicial
system, such as commercial arbitration, are available in many countries to large companies, though
not to ordinary citizens.  Perhaps even more importantly, formalism may be essential for justice in7
complex disputes even when informality is adequate for the simple cases we consider.
3
                                                          
3 Using the case of the collection of a bounced check also gets us away from the concern that rules governing the
eviction of a non-paying tenant are shaped by socialist sentiment in a country.   The fact that the structures of dispute
resolution for eviction and check collection are so similar is inconsistent with the view that socialism drives both.
Using the data from the participating law firms, we construct measures of formalism
(separately for eviction and for check collection), defined here as the extent to which the regulation
causes dispute resolution to deviate from the neighbor model.  Our data cover seven broad aspects
of formalism: (1) the use of professional judges and lawyers as opposed to lay judges and self-
representation, (2) the need to make written as opposed to oral arguments at various stages of the
process, (3) the necessity of legal justification of various actions by either disputants or judges, (4)
the regulation of evidence, (5) the nature of superior review of the first-instance judgment, (6)
engagement formalities during the dispute (such as service of process by a judicial officer), and (7)
the count of the number of independent procedural actions required by law.  Each category includes
a number of measures of formalism. From these data, we construct seven sub-indices of different
aspects of formalism, and then aggregate them into an overall index.
Research in comparative law and legal history suggests that formalism varies systematically
among legal origins (Berman 1983, Merryman 1985, Damaska 1986, Schlesinger et al. 1988).  In
particular, civil law countries generally regulate dispute resolution, including the conduct of the
adjudicators, more heavily than do common law countries.   What is particularly important about this
observation for our purposes is that most developing countries have inherited much of their legal
procedures from their colonizers.  Because legal procedures have been transplanted mostly
involuntarily, and have to a significant extent remained unchanged over decades, legal origin is a8
useful instrument for formalism.  This also suggests that formalism might be a heritage of the
colonial past rather than an efficient response to the conditions of each country.
Our data provide a striking empirical confirmation for the proposition that dispute resolution,
as measured by our indices, is more formalized in civil than in common law countries.  Legal origins
alone explain around 40% of the variation in formalism of dispute resolution among 109 countries.
 In nearly all dimensions, we find greater deviation from the informal neighbor ideal in civil law (and
especially French civil law) countries.  This result holds for both eviction and check collection.  We
also find that adjudication is more formalized in the less developed than in the rich countries.
   Formalism is not in itself proof of inefficiency: it may serve political goals of the state,
control the subversion of the legal system, or guarantee fairness and accuracy of trials.  Indeed, there
is nothing normatively significant about the neighbor model; we simply use it to organize
measurement.  Moreover, it is difficult to believe that the optimal amount of formalism in a modern
legal system is zero.  The question is what are the consequences of formalism for judicial quality.
Having established these basic differences in formalism among legal origins, we examine
several aspects of judicial quality.  From the participating law firms, we obtain estimates of the
expected duration of our specific disputes in calendar days, from the original filing of a complaint
to the ultimate enforcement of judgment.  In addition, we use indicators of judicial quality from other
data sources, covering such areas as judicial efficiency, enforceability of contracts, access to justice,
human rights protection, and corruption.  Last, we use data from the World Business Environment
Survey of small firms on the fairness, consistency, honesty, and other aspects of the legal system.
We find that, holding per capita income constant, procedural formalism is a strong predictor
of expected duration of dispute resolution.  Higher formalism also predicts lower judicial efficiency,9
higher corruption, lower honesty and consistency of the system, less fairness, and inferior access to
justice. These results hold both in ordinary least squares regressions, and in instrumental variable
estimates where legal origin is used as an instrument for formalism.  The results hold for both
eviction and check collection.  In our data, there is no evidence that formalism secures justice.
There are two broad interpretations of this evidence.  On the first, formalism represents an
efficient adaptation to the conditions of different countries, with countries exhibiting lower levels
of law and order “requiring” higher formalism.  On this interpretation, OLS evidence is simply a
reflection of country heterogeneity: formalism is desirable but does not fully compensate for the lack
of law and order.  On the second – more direct – interpretation of the evidence, many countries
exhibit excessive levels of judicial formalism, at least for simple disputes.  The fact that many
countries have inherited their legal procedures from their colonizers, and that legal origin explains
such a large share of variation in levels of formalism, supports the second theory over the first.   The
exogenous component of formalism predicts both long duration and low quality of adjudication.
The findings reported in this paper advance the previous research in three distinct ways.  
First, the paper takes the research on the quantitative measurement of institutions in a new direction:
the study of courts.   Finding objective measures of institutional structure is sometimes more useful
than just focusing on survey assessments of quality, as is often done, because it may point to the
specific directions of efficiency-improving reform.  Second, with respect to the study of courts, the
paper is novel in attributing both their efficiency and their ability to deliver justice to the
characteristics of the legal procedure, rather than to general underdevelopment of the country or to
poor management practices.   Third, the paper links both the lack of efficiency of courts and their
inability to deliver justice to the transplantation of legal systems.  As such, it supports the hypothesis10
that transplantation is in part responsible for the structure and quality of the existing institutions.
II.  Conceptual Issues.
Broad Theories
Shapiro (1981, p. 1) describes an idealized model of a court as follows: “The root concept
employed here is a simple one of conflict structured in triads.  Cutting quite across cultural lines, it
appears that whenever two persons come into a conflict that they cannot themselves solve, one
solution appealing to common sense is to call upon a third for assistance in achieving a resolution.
 So universal across time and space is this simple invention of triads that we can discover almost no
society that fails to employ it.  And from its overwhelming appeal to common sense stems the basic
political legitimacy of courts everywhere.  In short, the triad for the purposes of conflict resolution
is the basic social logic of courts, a logic so compelling that courts have become a universal political
phenomenon.”   In this universal model, the resolution of a dispute among two neighbors by a third
is guided by common sense and custom. It does not rely on formal law and certainly does not
circumscribe the procedures that the neighbors employ to address their differences.
Even though Shapiro may have captured the essential “courtness” of courts, it is striking how
far the courts everywhere deviate from this ideal.  They employ professional judges and lawyers,
rather than neighbors, to resolve disputes.  They follow heavily regimented procedures, restricting
how claims and counter-claims can be presented, how evidence can be interpreted, and how various
parties can communicate with each other.  Rather than holding an informal meeting, many courts
assemble written records of the proceedings, and allow disputants to appeal the decisions of a judge.
 Rather than adhere to Shapiro’s ideal, most jurisdictions heavily regulate their civil procedures. 11
So why isn’t the informal model of a court what we see in reality?  The reasons for regulating
dispute resolution are similar to those for regulating any other kind of activity: the sovereign has
either a public or a private reason for wishing a different outcome than that attained by the neighbor
model. Perhaps most importantly, as emphasized by Shapiro, most courts are associated with the
state, and sovereigns often have an interest in how disputes are resolved.  They might wish to punish
some undesirable conduct to a greater extent than a judge-neighbor would, to establish precedents,
or to reduce errors relative to informal adjudication.  They might alternatively wish disputes to be
resolved so as to favor themselves, or their friends, or their political supporters, as well as to punish
their enemies and political opponents.  They might also wish to make sure that disputes are resolved
in a consistent way across their domains, so as to promote trade or political uniformity.  They may
indeed use courts to promote policy innovations of sovereign interest, whether good or bad.  To
achieve these goals, sovereigns regulate the judicial procedure to ensure that the “judges are no more
than the mouth that pronounces the words of the law, mere passive beings, incapable of moderating
either its force or rigour” (Montesquieu [1748] 1984, p. 194).
A further reason to regulate dispute resolution is that informal triad justice is vulnerable to
subversion by the powerful.  As Shapiro points out, as soon as a neighbor has ruled in favor of one
of the disputants, it becomes two against one rather than a balanced triad.  If two neighbors can
always win against one, it obviously becomes in the interest of each disputant to influence the judge.
 Their ability to do so, in turn, is the crucial determinant of the viability of the triad system.  If one
of the two disputants is economically and politically more powerful than the other, he can encourage
the supposedly impartial judge to favor him.  He can do so with carrots, such as bribes and promises
of future favors, or with sticks, such as intimidation and violence.  The other side of this coin is12
access to justice: the less advantaged members of a society must expect justice rather than abuse
from the state or powerful opponents.  Without formalism, justice might be impossible to achieve.
  A leading Spanish scholar made this case a century ago: “The importance of procedural
laws dwells primarily and foremost in that they guarantee and regulate the individual’s right of
defense against all other individuals and the State itself, which in the exercise of the judicial power
could violate this right… In criminal law many crimes can be established—and in fact they have
been established—for the whim of the legislators; for the demands of the forms of government; for
religious and social concerns, and many crimes may also be abolished, without the social foundation
being fatally compromised. Yet no society or people can convict the citizens without hearing them;
without allowing them to justify; without granting them time and facilitate the means and conditions
to defend themselves.  And if this happens, such society and such people, corrupted by the repugnant
leper of despotism, start to disintegrate and rapidly die, for having within their bowels a poisonous
virus, incompatible with the vital principle of society” (López-Moreno 1901, p. 43).
For these, and possibly other reasons, most jurisdictions in the world, while adopting the
triad model in broad outline, heavily regulate its implementation.  As a consequence, legal
procedures are universally more formalized than the neighbor model would suggest.  Moreover, as
legal historians have long recognized, is that there are different broad traditions of such regulation,
intimately related to the civil versus common law origin of the country’s laws. These traditions have
derived from Roman and English law respectively, and were transplanted to many countries through
conquest and colonization (by France, Germany and Spain in the case of civil law, and England in
the case of common law).  Although legal systems of most countries have evolved since colonial
times, recent evidence shows that important features of legal origin are often preserved through the13
centuries (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998, 1999).
Different writers have different theories of how legal origin has shaped legal procedure in
general, and formalism in particular. Some, such as Hayek (1960) and Merryman (1985), attribute
the differences to the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution.  In France, the
revolutionaries and Napoleon did not trust the judges, and instituted heavily codified judicial
procedures as a way to control judicial discretion.  According to Schlesinger et al. (1988), in civil
law countries “the procedural codes are meant to be essentially all-inclusive statements of judicial
powers, remedies, and procedural devices.”  Consistent with von Jehring’s logic, procedural
formalism was seen as a guarantee of freedom.  In England and the United States, in contrast,
lawyers and judges were on the “right” side of the revolutions, and hence the political process
accommodated a great deal more judicial independence.  In the common law tradition, “a code is
supplemental to the unwritten law, and in construing its provisions and filling its gaps, resort must
be had to the common law”  (Schlesinger et al. 1988).  As a consequence, less formalism is required
in the judicial procedure.
Other writers, including Dawson (1960), Berman (1983), Damaska (1986), and Glaeser and
Shleifer (2002) argue that the procedural differences between common and civil law go back to the
12
th and 13
th centuries.  Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) attribute greater formalism to the need to protect
law enforcers from coercion by disputing parties through violence and bribes. This threat of coercion
was greater in the less peaceful France than in the more peaceful England, where neighborly dispute
resolution by juries (coming closer to Shapiro’s  ideal) was more feasible.   The different approaches
to legal procedure – motivated by the different law and order environments of England and France14
– were then transplanted through conquest and colonization through most of the rest of the world.
4
The fact that most countries in the world inherited significant parts of their legal procedures
– often involuntarily – is of great consequence to our analysis.  At the econometric level, it suggests
that legal origin can be used as an instrument for the degree of formalism of the legal procedure.  At
the substantive level, the nature of transplantation enables us to distinguish two hypotheses.  If
countries select their legal procedures voluntarily, then one can argue that greater formalism is an
efficient adaptation to a weaker law and order environment.  If, however, legal procedures are
transplanted through colonization, the efficient adaptation model does not apply.  Rather, we can
attribute the consequences of legal formalism to the exogenously determined features of the legal
procedure, and in this way consider the efficiency of alternative rules.
What is procedural formalism?
                                                          
4   On legal transplantation, see Watson (1974), La Porta et al. (1998), and Berkowitz et al. (2002).  Other recent
work on optimal institutional design includes Aghion and Alesina (2002).
The differences in the broad approaches to legal procedure between common and civil law
are reflected in potentially measurable areas of procedural formalism, which we call formalism for
short.  Below, we consider 7 such broad areas.
First, many countries rely on professional judges and lawyers in the operations of a court.
Professional judges often work for the government.  This ensures that the sovereign’s preferences
are recognized, but also enables the sovereign to protect judges, making them less vulnerable to
subversion.   Professional judges are also necessary when the sovereign insists on judgment in law
rather than equity. By prohibiting direct participation of private parties in the legal process without15
a duly licensed representative–who has to abide by tight standards of professional conduct and is
subject to close supervision–, the sovereign also raises the level of control over the judicial process.
This may serve to advance the sovereign goals as well as to prevent subversion, since a lawyer would
not allow their client’s improper appeals before the judge when their professional license is at stake.
Second, many countries mandate the use of written as opposed to oral presentation at various
stages of the procedure. This preference for written over oral presentation raises accountability and
facilitates sovereign control over the judicial process.  When every piece of evidence must be
presented in court with a lawyer’s memo, with a copy of such memo signed and sealed by the clerk,
and when every motion, exception, or piece of evidence must be accepted or rejected by the judge
in writing and signed, the entire procedure can be reproduced and subject to a thorough review by
an independent third party.  A written record with multiple copies prevents a biased judgment based
on the sudden disappearance of a key piece of evidence or of the entire file.
 Third, many countries require legal justification of civil complaints as well as judicial
decisions – a clear attack on the informality of the neighbor model.  The reasons are again clear: the
sovereign pursuing his interests and preventing subversion wants judges ruling according to his law
rather than exercising discretion inherent in informality.  Decisions motivated by religious, racial or
other prejudices of a judge can be avoided by demanding full justification of judgments on specific
articles of the law and legal reasons open to review.  
Fourth, every country regulates the manner in which evidence is gathered and presented or
banned in court. To prevent biased selection, judges are banned from rejecting evidence requested
by the parties. Hearsay is prohibited because it cannot be controverted in open court.  Mandatory pre-
qualification of questions by the judge and prohibition of partisan interrogation prevent harassment16
of witnesses. Rules on authenticity and weight of evidence intend to preclude biased or unfounded
assessments of facts.  In all these and other ways, the regulation of evidence can serve to achieve the
state’s goals and reduce the dangers of subversion.
   Fifth, many countries rely on comprehensive appeal procedures and extensive superior review
of trial courts’ decisions.  Written records are complementary with appeals; without a record, the
appeal must be limited or a trial must be held de novo.  More generally, both written records and
appeals are part of sovereign control of dispute resolution, used to assess, evaluate, and reverse
judicial decisions should the superior court so desire.  Both the pursuit of sovereign goals and the
protection of judges from subversion are promoted through such arrangements.
Sixth, all countries regulate how and when a party can be considered bound by the court
proceedings through engagement formalities.  These include rules of notification and other
procedures, such as mandatory pre-trial reconciliation, that must be used before a party can be
brought to court. These rules are justified by the need to guarantee the defendant’s right to defend.
 “The most elementary requirement of due notice is that each party should receive notice of the other
side’s case. This is the province of that complex bundle of rules, often very technical, concerning
‘service’ of writs and other formal procedural documents. These rules are intended to provide a safe
and verifiable means of giving each party proper notice of proceedings” (Andrews, 1994).
Finally, many countries have very detailed regulations that control the proceedings step by
step. Many of these steps can be best understood from the perspective of controlling errors as well
as subversion: they are intended to ensure that a party cannot gain advantage in a trial by unfairly
manipulating the process.  For example, a certain number of days must elapse between one action
and the next to ensure that the affected party has had enough opportunity to respond.  17
This discussion suggests that formalism can often be rationalized from the perspective of
sovereign’s public or private reasons to regulate.  The empirical questions that the discussion raises
are: how can we measure formalism in dispute resolution in different countries?; does it vary
systematically among legal origins?; and is the variation systematically related to the quality of the
legal system?  Ultimately, the optimal level of formalism is an empirical question.  Below, we
describe our approach to the measurement of formalism and the evaluation of its consequences.
III.  Methodology.
Data Collection Procedures
The data used in this paper are derived from questionnaires answered by attorneys at Lex
Mundi and Lex Africa member firms.  Lex Mundi and Lex Africa are international associations of
law firms, which include as their members law firms with offices in 115 countries. Of the 115
countries, Lex Mundi members in six did not accept our invitation to join the project, and these six
jurisdictions (Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Northern Ireland, Scotland, St. Kitts and Nevis)
were removed from the sample. We have received and codified data from all the others.
The 109 cooperating law firms received a questionnaire designed by the authors with the
advice of practicing attorneys from Argentina, Belgium, Botswana, Colombia, Mexico, and the
United States.  The questionnaire covered the step-by-step evolution of an eviction and a check
collection procedure before local courts in the country’s largest city.  In presenting the cases, we
provided the respondent firm with significant detail, including the amount of the claim, the location
and main characteristics of the litigants, the presence of city regulations, the nature of the remedy
requested by the plaintiff, the merit of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s claims, and the social18
implications of the judicial outcomes.  Furthermore, to understand how courts work, we specified
that there is no settlement.  These standardized details enabled the respondent law firms to describe
the procedures explicitly and in full detail, and allowed us to get around the problem that different
procedures arise in different circumstances.  Our approach is preferred to just a general reading and
codification of laws, where comparability across countries might not be achieved with similar
precision.  Moreover, the focus on two distinct cases—eviction and check collection—allowed us
to deal with different types of procedures in sample countries, and thus provided a robustness check
for our indices of regulation of dispute resolution.  Finally, we have discovered that even the largest
law firms in most countries employed individuals familiar with eviction and check collection
procedures, generally because they have worked on such cases for their clients.
The questionnaires provided to law firms were divided into two parts: (1) description of the
procedure of the hypothetical case step by step, and (2) multiple choice questions.  The following
aspects of the procedure were covered: (1) step by step description of the procedure, (2) estimates
of the actual duration at each stage, (3) indication of whether written submissions were required at
each stage, (4) indication of specific laws applicable at each stage, (5) indication of mandatory time
limits at each stage, (6) indication of the form of the appeal, and (7) the existence of alternative
administrative procedures.  Multiple-choice questions were used both to collect additional
information and to check the presentations and the uniformity of concepts used at the initial stage.
Prior to launching the project, the model questionnaire and two sample answers (the U.S. and
Colombia) were sent to and completed by Lex Mundi members in five countries, which represent
different legal institutions and different levels of economic development (France, Germany, Jordan,
Kenya, and India).  Their answers were used to improve the questionnaire.  All firms responding in19
the general round received sample answers for Colombia, France, Germany and the U.S. (represented
by New York City).  The completion of the questionnaires required extensive interaction by
telephone and email between the authors and the attorneys at law firms.  At each firm, the answers
were prepared by a member of the Litigation Department, and reviewed by a member of the General
Corporate and Commercial Department, which created an internal check within the firm.  Two
lawyers in each law firm, from different departments, were required to read, approve, and sign the
questionnaire.  As an additional check, the law firms were required to indicate when a particular law
governed the relevant stage of the procedure, and to provide a copy of that law.
  The answers provided by member law firms were coded using the descriptions of the
procedures  and answers to multiple-choice questions.  In most cases, coding was followed by an
additional round of questions to the completing attorneys aimed to clarify the inconsistencies in their
answers.  In our preliminary presentation of these data, several judges and litigation experts from
different countries recommended exploring incentives for attorneys as an alternative determinant of
efficiency.  We subsequently asked all participant law firms a set of questions dealing with this issue.
 Finally, to ensure comparability, the count of independent procedural actions was reviewed and
returned to every law firm for confirmation.
The Variables
We wish to measure the regulation of dispute resolution relative to Shapiro’s (1981)
hypothetical benchmark of a neighbor resolving a dispute among two others.  Comparative law
textbooks and manuals of civil procedure point to several areas where the laws of different countries
regulate such dispute resolution differently.  In our choice of the areas of regulation of dispute20
resolution, we were particularly guided by the Civil Procedure-International Encyclopaedia of Laws
published by Kluwer Law International.  The Encyclopedia covers 17 countries from different legal
origins, and discusses such broad areas of civil procedure as judicial organization, jurisdiction,
actions and claims, nature of proceedings, legal costs, evidence, enforcement of judgments, and
arbitration.  Some of the areas covered in the Encyclopedia were not relevant to the simple disputes
we considered.  Others, such as ADR, are covered briefly in our survey, although we focus on courts.
Appendix 1 presents the relationship between the topics covered in the Encyclopedia’s volume on
Civil Procedure for France and the indices used in this paper.
We focus on seven areas of formalism, and codify the answers provided by Lex Mundi firms
from the perspective of the neighbor model. Below, we briefly describe our approach to organizing
these data. The exact definitions of the variables are contained in Table 1.
The first area covers the required degree of professionalism of the main actors in the judicial
process, namely judges and lawyers.  This comprises three specific areas.  First, a basic jurisdictional
distinction is between general and specialized courts.  For the simple cases we consider, access to
specialized courts generally entails procedural simplification aimed at “mass production” (similar
to traffic courts in the U.S.).  As a consequence, we take the resolution of disputes in specialized
courts to be closer to the neighbor model than that in a general jurisdiction court. 
Second, we distinguish between judges who have undergone complete professional training,
and arbitrators, administrative officers, practicing attorneys, merchants, or any other lay persons who
may be authorized to hear or decide the case.  In some countries (e.g., New Zealand, United Arab
Emirates) all disputes between landlords and tenants are resolved by housing tribunals composed of21
neighbors or by representatives of associations of landlords and tenants.   Such non-professional
judges are closer to the neighbor model. 
Third, in some countries it is mandatory to have an attorney to appear before the judge, while
in others it is entirely voluntary or even prohibited. Evidently, the absence of legal representation is
closer to the neighbor model.  Indeed, in the absence of such representation, the judge frequently
assumes the position of a mediator guiding the parties to an agreement.
Using the data provided by law firms, we combine these three pieces of information to
construct the “professional versus laymen” index for each of the two disputes for each country.
The second area we consider is the preeminence of written versus oral presentation at each
stage of the procedure, including filing, service of process, defendant’s opposition, evidence, final
arguments, judgment, notification of judgment, and enforcement of judgment.  We take oral
presentation to be closer to the neighbor model, and aggregate this information for each country and
each case into the index of “written versus oral” elements.
The third area is the need for legal justification (meaning reference to the legal reasons and
articles of the law) in the complaint and in the judgment, as well as the necessity of basing the
judgment in the law as opposed to equity.  In many countries, a judgment must be justified by
statutory law or settled precedents.  In other countries, judgment must still be justified, but in equity
rather than in law.  In still other countries, judicial decisions require no justification whatsoever.
Since the neighbor model presumably does not call for such legal justifications, we aggregate this
information into an index of “legal justification.”
The fourth area is statutory regulation of evidence.  The rules of evidence are sometimes
considered to be a key factor in differentiating the overall efficiency of legal procedures among22
countries (Langbein 1985).  First, in some countries, the judge cannot request evidence not requested
by the parties, a restriction on the neighbor model.  Second, the judge in some countries cannot
refuse to collect or admit evidence requested by the parties, even if the judge feels this evidence is
irrelevant to the case.  This, too, presents a restriction on the discretion of the judge in the neighbor
model.  Third, hearsay evidence is not admissible in some countries while, in others, the judge can
weigh it.  Presumably, the inadmissibility of out-of-court statements is a restriction on judicial
freedom in the neighbor model.  Fourth, in some jurisdictions, the judge must pre-qualify a question
before it is posed to the witness while, in others, parties may ask witnesses questions without such
pre-qualification.  We take the latter scenario as more compatible with the neighbor model.  Fifth,
in some jurisdictions, only original documents and certified copies are admissible, a restriction not
present in other jurisdictions.  Presumably, the neighbor model would not have these restrictions.
Sixth, in some countries, authenticity and the weight of evidence are defined by law; in others, they
are not.  In the neighbor model, we would not expect the evidence to be subjected to rigid rules on
admissibility and weight.  Seventh, in some countries, but not others, there is mandatory recording
of evidence, designed to facilitate the superior authority’s control over the judge.  We do not take
such recording to be consistent with the neighbor model.  As before, we aggregate these seven
dimensions into the index of “statutory regulation of evidence.”
The fifth area of regulation of formalism is the control of the superior review of the first
instance judgment.  The scope of appellate review determines the level of sovereign control over the
trial court proceedings (Damaska, 1986).  In general, we take the control of a judge by a superior
court as inconsistent with the neighbor model, and consider a variety of mechanisms of superior
review.  First, in some countries, the enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until the23
resolution of the appeal, which substantially reduces the importance of the first instance judgment.
 In others, the suspension of enforcement is either non-automatic, or even not allowed.  We take the
automatic suspension as being inconsistent with the neighbor model. Second, in some countries, the
review and appeal of judicial decisions are comprehensive.  In others, more compatibly with the
neighbor model, only new evidence or issues of law can be reviewed on appeal, or the judgment
cannot be appealed at all.  Third, some countries, but not others, allow interlocutory appeals (those
of interim judicial decisions), which we take to be incompatible with the neighbor model.   We
aggregate these three aspects of review into an “index of control of superior review.”
The sixth area is engagement formalities that must be observed before a party is legally
bound by the court proceedings.  In some countries a lawsuit cannot be initiated unless a formal pre-
trial conciliation is attempted between the parties. The notification procedures also vary markedly
among countries.  In some places, the complaint can be notified to the defendant by the plaintiff
himself or by his attorney, or simply by mailing a letter.  In others, the defendant cannot be held
accountable unless he is served the claim by an appointed court officer.  Finally, in some countries
the judgment is deemed notified to the parties when pronounced in open court; in others it must be
personally notified to the parties by a dully appointed court employee. We submit that entirely
voluntary pre-trial conciliation and flexible rules of notification of process and judgment are more
compatible with the neighbor model. These three dimensions are aggregated into the index of
“engagement formalities.”
The seventh area is the count of independent procedural actions involved in pursuing a claim
through a court, covering the filing and service of a complaint, trial and judgment, and enforcement.
 An independent procedural action is defined as every step in the procedure, mandated by the law24
or by court regulation, which demands interaction between the parties or between them and the judge
or court officer, such as filing a motion or attending a hearing.  We also count as an independent
procedural action every judicial or administrative writ or resolution, such as issuing judgment or
entering a writ of execution, which is legally required to advance the proceedings until the
enforcement of judgment.  Actions are always assumed to be simultaneous if possible, so procedural
events that may be fulfilled in the same day and place are only counted as one action.
5  In the
idealized neighbor model, there would be only three procedural actions: (1) a claimant would request
the judge’s intervention, (2) the judge and the claimant would together meet the defendant and the
judge would issue a decision following a discussion, and (3) the judgment would be enforced.  As
the evidence below shows, in some countries, checks can be collected and tenants evicted in just 8
or 9 steps, while in others it takes 40 to 45 steps – a far cry from the neighbor model. We aggregate
these counts into an index of “independent procedural actions” and normalize the index to fall
between zero and one based on the minimum and the maximum number of actions among countries.
Having assembled the data, we combine the seven sub-indexes into the index of formalism.
 We scale each subindex to fall between zero and 1, so the formalism index falls between 0 and 7,
with 7 representing, according to our conception, the greatest distance from the neighbor model.  The
exact method of the construction of the formalism index is not crucial, since the various sub-indices
generally point in the same direction as to which countries regulate adjudication more heavily. 
                                                          
5  We only count the minimum number of independent procedural actions required to bring the case to completion. Thus,
the appointment of a lawyer is only counted as a step if legal representation is mandatory.  Notifications of interlocutory
decisions that do not require further interaction between the parties and the judge or court officer  (as when the clerk
makes an entry into the notification book) are not counted as separate steps since they are ancillary to the decision.  25
Our data also enable us to provide some information on the quality of dispute resolution (see
Table 1 for the description of the data).  One measure of quality is an estimate – in calendar days –
of duration of the process of dispute resolution by the lawyers who completed the questionnaires.
 Duration is measured as the number of calendar days counted from the moment the plaintiff files
the lawsuit in court, until the moment of actual repossession (eviction) or payment (check).  This
measure includes both the days where actions take place and waiting periods between actions.  The
participating firms make separate estimates of the average duration until the completion of service
of process, the issuance of judgment (duration of trial), and the moment of payment or repossession
(duration of enforcement).
6  To the extent that we are interested in the ability of an ordinary person
to use the legal system, these estimates of duration are highly relevant for efficiency.
In addition to the data from the questionnaires, we use data from surveys of business people
on the quality of the legal system.  Some standard surveys we rely on include measures of the
efficiency of the judicial system, law enforcement quality, equality of access to non-discriminatory
justice, human rights, and corruption.  In addition, we use information from small firm assessments
of various aspects of the quality of the legal system, including consistency, honesty, and fairness,
contained in the World Business Environment Survey.   These data will be used to shed light on the
crucial question: does formalism secure  justice?
                                                          
6 Law firms also provide us with estimates of the minimum and the maximum amount of time in calendar days each case
could take given its specifics. This request helped lawyers to focus on the average length of time and not just think about
the worst or best case they had encountered.26
IV. Procedural formalism.
Table 2 presents our data on procedural formalism, with sub-indices and the overall index.
Table 2a focuses on eviction, and Table 2b on check collection (Appendices 2A and 2B provide the
data on each variable in the sub-indices for all countries).  The countries are arranged by legal origin,
and the tables report the means and the medians by legal origin, as well as the tests of the differences
in means and medians across legal origins.    
Some examples illustrate the data.  In New Zealand, the eviction of a non-paying tenant is
handled by a specialized limited jurisdiction housing court, the “Tenancy Tribunal”. The cases are
decided by lay judges called “adjudicators”, some of which do not even hold a law degree. Attorneys
are not prohibited but strongly discouraged, so the overwhelming majority of cases are handled
without the assistance of a lawyer.  The proceedings are conducted orally, and most cases are decided
in a single hearing.  The presentation of the complaint, the opposition, the evidence, and the
arguments, all take place at the hearing. The judgment is normally announced in court at the end of
the hearing.   The complaint is an informal document that briefly describes the facts and controversy
in layperson’s language.  Legal reasoning and justification in specific articles of the law are neither
required nor expected.  The judgment may be motivated on either law or equity, as long as written
reasons are provided.  Evidence is scarcely regulated; it need not be on oath, it can be oral or written,
and it is not bound by strict rules on administration and evaluation.  The tenant and the landlord are
both entitled to attend and be heard, to call evidence and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Tenancy Tribunal may call for and receive as evidence any statement, document, information,
matter or thing that in its opinion may assist to deal effectively with the case before it.  Appeal of
first instance judgments is available, but only a tiny fraction of the decisions are appealed and it does27
not automatically suspend the enforcement of judgment.  Interlocutory appeals are prohibited. 
Notifications are normally by mail, without formalities or mandatory intervention of judicial officers.
The entire procedure only takes ten Independent Procedural Actions from filing to actual
enforcement of judgment.  The formalism index for eviction in New Zealand is 1.25.
In Portugal, in contrast, evictions are handled by a professional judge at a civil district court,
the “Tribunal de Comarca.” The landlord needs to appoint a lawyer. The proceedings are mostly
conducted in written form and most of the interaction among the parties and the judge is through
written documents filed before the court.  The complaint, the answer to the complaint, the answer
to the opposition and to every motion filed by the parties must be in writing. The complaint must
comply with formal requirements specified by law, and it must be expressly motivated in law and
in facts.  The court must verify compliance with formal requirements before admitting the lawsuit.
 Judgment is rendered in writing and fully justified in law and facts. Judgment must be motivated
exclusively on legal grounds (not on equity).  The judge takes the main responsibility for gathering
and sifting the evidence, and he must pre-qualify the questions before they are asked of the
witnesses. Appeal is comprehensive and it automatically suspends enforcement of judgment.
Interlocutory appeals are broadly allowed.  Notifications are mostly by mail.  Finally, the procedure
takes at least 22 Independent Procedural Actions from filing to enforcement. The formalism index
for eviction in Portugal is 4.54.
Consider next check collection, shown in Table 2B.  In the United Kingdom, the procedure
for the collection of a bounced check is in most cases dismissed without a trial because the claimant
obtains a summary judgment on the basis that the defendant has no real prospect of defending the
claim.  In most cases parties act without legal representation.  The proceedings are conducted at an28
oral hearing attended by the parties and the judge. The claim is filed in writing, albeit informally.
 Judgment is normally given immediately after the hearing. Legal justification of claims is neither
required not expected. Allocation questionnaires, explained in layperson’s language, are sent to both
parties to assess the expected burden and duration of the proceedings, so that the court can plan
accordingly. Written reasons for judgment are not generally given, unless one party wishes to appeal.
 Judgment may be motivated on law or on equity grounds.  Evidence is mostly gathered and
presented by the parties and freely weighted by the judge.  It is not mandatory to have a written
record of all evidence introduced at trial.  The right to appeal is not automatic; permission to appeal
must be requested before the judge and is frequently denied.  The claim is notified to the defendant
by mail and service is deemed effective on the second day after posting.  The defendant must file an
acknowledgment of service to prevent a default judgment.  Judgment is normally notified in court.
 Finally, the procedure takes 12 Independent Procedural Actions from filing to actual enforcement.
The formalism index for check collection in the United Kingdom is 2.58.
   The collection of a bounced check in Austria is tried before a regular commercial court.
Legal representation is very common in all cases and mandatory beyond certain limit (US$3,500).
The proceedings are mostly conducted in written form and most of the interaction among the parties
and the judge is through written documents filed before the court.  As a matter of principle, the
judgment shall be announced orally immediately at the end of the final hearing, which is not the
practice, though.  If orally pronounced, it must be drawn in writing within four weeks.  The claim
must be fully justified and it must comply with formal requirements to be admissible. It is not
mandatory but very common to include specific articles of the law. In the case of legal representation
a qualified attorney must sign the complaint.  The judgment must contain a detailed description of29
the proceedings, including particulars of the parties/attorneys, competent court, reference number,
name of judge, date of decision, relief sought, motions by both parties, results of evidence, reasons,
applicable law, decision, and an instruction on parties’ right to appeal.  By law, there must be a
written or magnetic record of all evidence introduced at trial.  Appeal is filed before the court of first
instance and it automatically suspends enforcement. Notifications are heavily regulated. The
complaint must be personally delivered to the defendant’s residence together with a payment order
containing legal instructions on the defendant’s right to oppose.  After a second unsuccessful attempt
of delivery, a notice of deposit is affixed to the defendant’s dwelling.  Finally, at least 20
Independent Procedural Actions are required to complete the procedure.  The formalism index for
check collection in Austria is 3.52.
More generally, as Table 2 shows, for both check collection and eviction, the data clearly
reveal that common law countries have least formalized, and French civil law countries most
formalized dispute resolution, with other legal origins in the middle.  For eviction, the differences
hold for all sub-indices, but are stronger in some areas (legal justification, number of independent
procedural actions) than in others (evidence, superior review).  The differences in formalism among
civil law countries (French, German, socialist and Scandinavian) are less pronounced, and typically
not as statistically significant (except that German and Scandinavian origin countries regulate less
heavily than Socialist and French ones).  For check collection, the pattern of results is similar, except
that one of the sub-indices is lower in French civil law countries than in common law countries.  We
return to this evidence more systematically in the regression analysis presented in Table 5, but note
that the findings are broadly consistent with the thrust of the comparative law literature.30
Table 3 examines the consistency of this evidence across the various sub-indices measuring
alternative aspects of procedural formalism, as well as across the two cases.  The evidence presents
a clear picture of consistency.  The various sub-indices are positively correlated with the overall
index within each case.  Moreover, across the two types of cases, the same sub-indices are strongly
positively correlated with each other.  The correlation of the formalism index between check
collection and eviction is 0.83.  In contrast to the general pattern, the evidence and review sub-
indices are uncorrelated with the others.  For most aspects of formalism, however, it appears that
some countries regulate dispute resolution more heavily than others.
Table 4 asks whether the differences in formalism among countries are also a consequence
of the level of economic development.  Economic historians have argued that poor institutions are
a consequence of underdevelopment, and only development itself brings about improved institutions,
including the legal system (Demsetz 1967, North 1981, 1990).  Table 4 compares formalism among
countries divided into quartiles of per capita income.  We find lower formalism in the richest
countries, but no difference between the poorest countries and the middle 50 percent.  Table 4 also
shows that the richest countries have the lowest levels of formalism both within common law and
within the French civil law countries.
In Table 5, we examine the determinants of formalism looking at the sub-indices and the
overall index.  Panel A looks at eviction, and Panel B at check collection.  The omitted dummy is
common law legal origin. Using the regressions that hold legal origin constant, the result that richer
countries have lighter regulation of adjudication holds both for the eviction of a tenant and the check
collection procedures.  At the same time, the R-squared from using (the logarithm of) per capita
income as the explanatory variable is only 4% for eviction and 8% for check collection.31
The data for most sub-indices and the overall index also show that dispute resolution in
socialist and French civil law countries is more formalized than it is in common law countries, even
holding per capita income constant.  The point estimates in the regressions are consistent with the
means in Table 2, yielding roughly the same order of legal origins, and in most cases the coefficients
are statistically significant.  Dispute resolution in German and Scandinavian origin countries also
appears to be more formalized than in common law countries, although the results for sub-indices
are generally statistically insignificant.   Perhaps most remarkably in Table 5, incremental R-squared
in explaining the formalism index from the legal origin dummies is 40%: nearly half of the residual
variation in formalism (holding per capita income constant) is explained by the legal tradition.
These results provide striking evidence in favor of the hypothesis from the comparative law
literature that there are systematic differences in legal procedure across legal families, and, more
specifically, civil law countries have more formal dispute resolution than do common law countries.
7
The next question is whether these differences in formalism matter for the quality of adjudication.
V.  Consequences of formalism.
In the next several tables, we turn to the consequences of formalism for the quality of the
legal system.  Table 6 presents the raw information, by country, on the estimated duration of dispute
resolution.  As in Table 2, countries are arranged by legal origin.  A striking aspect of Table 6 is the
extraordinary length of time it takes, on average, to pursue either claim in court. The worldwide
average time for accomplishing an eviction is 254 (median of 202) calendar days, and for collecting
                                                          
7 We also consider the hypothesis that the influence of Catholicism, with its protection of creditors, shapes judicial
formalism.  Although the percentage of a country’s population that is catholic is a statistically significant determinant
of formalism, this variable becomes insignificant in a horse-race with legal origin, which remains important.32
a check 234 (median of 197) calendar days.   With all the other costs, this number suggests why
individuals in most countries choose not to use the formal legal system to resolve their disputes.
There is tremendous variation in the estimated duration of each procedure among countries
Eviction is estimated to take 49 days in the U.S., 547 in Austria and 660 in Bulgaria.  Check
collection is estimated to take 60 in New Zealand, 527 in Colombia, and 645 in Italy.  The
comparison by legal origin for eviction puts common law and Scandinavian legal origin countries
on top (shortest duration) and socialist and French legal origin countries at the bottom.  Interestingly,
and consistent with earlier work on creditor rights in Germany (La Porta et al. 1997), German legal
origin countries are comparatively more efficient at check collection than at eviction. But the bottom
line of Table 6 is the higher expected duration in civil law countries.  In the words of an Indonesian
legal scholar, “in connection with the nature of judicial process itself and considering the formal,
punctual, and rather complicated manners and usages upheld by courts according to the Law of
Procedure (especially for the laymen), it could be said that correct judgment can not be performed
in a short time” (Gandasurbrata 1980, p.7).
Table 7 presents summary statistics on other measures of judicial quality.  The left panel
confirms the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) that, using measures of the quality of the legal system
from business surveys, German and Scandinavian legal origin countries generally score the highest,
with common law countries next, and French civil law countries the lowest.  This particular result,
however, should be interpreted with caution since these measures of the quality of the legal system
are highly correlated with per capita income, and German and Scandinavian legal origin countries
are considerably richer than the rest. 33
The right panel of Table 7 is based on the World Business Environment Survey (WBES)
conducted by the World Bank in 2000.  The questionnaire, which was answered by managers of
small firms (below 50 employees), was designed to cover various dimensions of efficiency and
quality of the judicial system. Although there is no specific question about the accuracy of the
judicial system, respondents are asked whether it is fair and impartial and whether it is consistent –
both partly reflections of accuracy.  The results show that common law countries are perceived to
have fairer, more honest, faster, more affordable, and more consistent judicial systems than French
and Socialist legal origin countries. Respondents had higher confidence in the legal system and felt
that court decisions were better enforced in common law countries. 
Table 8 presents the regression results of the determinants of judicial quality, using per capita
income and our index of formalism as explanatory variables.  Panel A focuses on eviction, and panel
B on check collection.  For both procedures, expected duration is not related to the level of per capita
income in a statistically significant way.  In contrast, expected duration is highly correlated with
procedural formalism. Countries with higher formalism, not surprisingly, have longer expected times
of using the judicial system to evict a non-paying tenant or to collect a check.  This result has
important implications: it suggests that legal structure, rather than the level of development, shapes
this crucial dimension of judicial efficiency.
Some examples illustrate the findings of Table 8.  Malawi is a low-income common law
country, with per capita income of $180.  It has a formalism index of 3.14 for eviction, and expected
duration of only 35 days.  It also has a formalism index of 2.95 for check collection, and expected
duration of 108 days.  By comparison, Mozambique is a low-income French legal origin country,
with per capita income of $220.  It has one of the highest formalism indices of 5.15 for eviction, and34
expected duration of 540 days.  For check collection, its formalism index is 4.49, and expected
duration is 540 days.   The same pattern emerges if we compare middle income countries (e.g., New
Zealand versus Portugal), as well as rich countries (e.g., United Kingdom versus Austria).
These striking results on expected duration raise the crucial question: does procedural
formalism, at the cost of longer proceedings, buy higher quality justice controlling for differences
in levels of economic development?  The answer suggested by Table 8 is NO.
Note first that richer countries have higher quality justice as indicated by nearly all survey
measures. More interestingly, nearly all survey measures suggest that higher formalism is associated
with inferior justice, holding per capita income constant.  This result holds, with minor differences,
for both eviction and check collection.  It holds for judicial efficiency, access to justice, enforcement
of contracts, and corruption.  It also holds in the reports by small firms in World Business
Environment Survey.  Here higher formalism is associated with less fairness and impartiality of the
legal system, less honesty, lower speed (consistent with the results on expected duration), less
consistency, less reliable enforcement, and less confidence in the legal system (significant only for
check collection). The effect of formalism is still negative, but not consistently significant, for the
affordability of the legal system and human rights.  Table 8 provides the basic bottom line of this
paper: at least for simple disputes, higher formalism is associated not only with the expected higher
duration of dispute resolution, but also with lower quality justice as perceived by participants.
One concern with the results in Table 8 is that the quality of dispute resolution might be
driven by other exogenous factors, possibly correlated with formalism.  Following La Porta et al.
(1999), we have rerun all the regressions in Table 8 controlling for ethno-linguistic fractionalization,
distance from the equator, and the physical size of the country.  Formalism remains significant in35
nearly all specifications, while the other factors are generally insignificant.  As a further robustness
check, we re-estimated the regressions in Table 8 separately for countries with above and below
median per capita income.  In most specifications, formalism remains a significant determinant of
quality in both the rich and the poor countries.
In Table 9, we repeat the analysis of Table 8 using legal origin dummies as instruments for
the formalism index.  With some exceptions, the results remain statistically significant, and confirm
that formalism has adverse effects on both the expected duration of proceedings and other aspects
of quality of the legal system.  The exogeneity of legal origin for most countries in the sample
suggests that it is unlikely to be the case that countries with a worse law and order environment
choose heavier formalism. The instrumental variable results suggest the opposite direction of
causality.  Specifically, countries that have inherited legal systems with heavily formalized dispute
resolution end up with lower quality legal systems, at least for simple disputes.
At the same time, the instrumental variable procedure cannot reject the hypothesis that the
adverse effect of French civil law on the efficiency and quality of dispute resolution works through
a channel other than formalism.  For example, suppose that the transplantation of French legal rules
is conducive to general state interventionism and bureaucratic inefficiency, as argued in La Porta et
al. (1999), and that this channel undermines the performance of courts as well.  In this case, we
cannot be sure that formalism, as opposed to general interventionism, is the culprit.  To assess this
alternative, we repeat the analysis in Tables 8 and 9 using in place of formalism a measure of state
interventionism having nothing to do with courts per se, namely the heaviness of regulation of entry
by new firms from Djankov et al. (2002).   The latter paper finds that such regulation is heavier in
French civil law countries than in common law countries.  When we do this analysis, we find that,36
indeed, the regulation of entry predicts longer duration of dispute resolution, and lower quality of
adjudication, in both the OLS and instrumental variable regressions.  However, the explanatory
power of regulation of entry is only 4 to 5%, compared to the explanatory power of formalism of 18
to 20% . Thus, while we cannot reject the hypothesis that the channel of influence of legal origin on
the efficiency and quality of dispute resolution is general interventionism, the channel we have
identified in this paper, namely procedural formalism, explains much more than a generic measure
of interventionism. 
In our analysis, we also considered a number of other potential determinants of judicial
quality, such as statutory protections of defendants, methods of compensation of attorneys, and
mandatory limits on the time that various parties have to complete the steps in the process of
adjudication.  Some commentators on our paper have argued that these factors, which shape the
incentives of the participants in the legal system, are more important for the quality of adjudication
than procedural formalism.  Except for the possible beneficial effects of hourly compensation of
attorneys on duration (in contradiction to the incentives argument), we do not find much evidence
that these alternative determinants of judicial quality matter.  Moreover, the adverse influence of
formalism persists even holding these alternative factors constant.
VII.  Conclusion
We present an analysis of legal procedures triggered by resolving two specific disputes—the
eviction of a non-paying tenant and the collection of a bounced check—in 109 countries.  The data
come from detailed descriptions of these procedures by Lex Mundi member law firms.  For each
country, the analysis leads to an index of formalism —a measure of the extent to which its legal37
procedure differs from the hypothetical benchmark of a neighbor informally resolving a dispute
between two other neighbors.  We then ask whether formalism varies systematically across countries,
and whether it shapes the quality of the legal system.
Consistent with the literature on comparative law, we find that judicial formalism is
systematically greater in civil law countries, and especially French civil law countries, than in
common law countries.  We also find lower formalism in the richest countries.  The expected
duration of dispute resolution is often extraordinarily high, suggesting significant inefficiencies.  The
expected duration is systematically higher in countries with more formalized proceedings, but is
independent of the level of development.  Perhaps more surprisingly, formalism is nearly universally
associated with lower survey measures of the quality of legal system, including judicial efficiency,
access to justice, honesty, consistency, impartiality, fairness, and even human rights.
There are two broad views of this evidence.  According to the first, greater formalism is
efficient in some countries, for a number of possible reasons.  It can reduce error, it can advance
benign political goals, or it can protect the judicial process from possible subversion by powerful
interests.  On this view, the various regulatory steps, such as reliance on professional judges and
collection of written evidence, are there to secure a fair judicial process.  Put differently, while
heavily formalized adjudication appears problematic on some measures, adjudication would be even
more problematic without the regulation. 
According to the second view, many developing countries accepted the formalism in
adjudication they now have as part of the transplantation of their legal system from their colonizers.
On this view, there is no presumption that the transplanted system is efficient.  Although heavy
procedural formalism has theoretically plausible reasons for its existence, the reality it brings is38
extreme costs and delays, unwillingness by potential participants to use the court system, and
ultimately injustice.  At least some of the burdens of formalism may therefore be unnecessary, and
could be relieved through reform, especially for simple disputes. 
We believe that the evidence in this paper supports the second theory.  Specifically, the
evidence points to extremely long expected duration of dispute resolution, suggesting that courts are
not an attractive venue for resolving disputes.  Furthermore, we find no offsetting benefits of
formalism, even when looking at a variety of measures of the perception of fairness and justice by
the users of the legal system.  Moreover, legal origin itself appears to determine judicial quality,
other things equal, suggesting that formalism is unlikely to be part of a benevolent design.
The evidence suggests that the systems of dispute resolution in many countries may be
inefficient – at least as far as simple disputes are concerned.  In particular, one cannot assume in
economic analysis, especially as applied to developing countries, that contract enforcement is
costless thanks to the functioning of courts.  Indeed, in light of our evidence, it is probably safer to
assume that most simple contracts cannot be enforced in courts at all and that economic agents must
find alternative strategies of contracting and contract enforcement.   At the theoretical level, this
analysis suggests that the incomplete contracting models of Grossman and Hart (1986) are a useful
way to think about reality.  At the empirical level, the analysis suggests that at least some
institutional features of developing countries, such as financial underdevelopment, integration of
firms into groups, and the importance of family businesses, might constitute a response to the
difficulties of using courts to resolve disputes. 39
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This table describes the variables in the paper.  Unless otherwise specified, the source for the variables is the survey to law firms and
the laws of each country.
Variable Description
Professionals vs. laymen
General jurisdiction court The variable measures whether a court of general jurisdiction or  a court of limited jurisdiction would be chosen or assigned
to hear and decide the case under normal circumstances . For the purposes of this study, we define a court of general jurisdiction
as a State institution, recognized by the law as part of the regular court system, generally competent to hear and decide regular
civil or criminal cases.  A limited jurisdiction court is defined as a court that would hear and decide only some type of civil
cases, which encompasses specialized debt-collection or housing courts, small-claims courts, and arbitrators or justices of the
peace. The variable equals one for a court of general jurisdiction, and zero for a court of limited jurisdiction.
Professional vs. non-
professional judge
The variable measures whether the judge, or the members of the court or tribunal, could be considered as professional judges
or not. A professional judge would be a judge that has undergone through a complete professional training to this effect as
required by law, and whose primary activity is to act as judge or member of a court. A non-professional judge would be an
arbitrator, administrative officer, practicing attorney or merchant, or any other layperson that may be authorized to hear and
decide the case. The variable equals one for a professional judge, and zero for a non-professional judge.
Legal representation is
mandatory
The variable measures whether for the case provided, the law requires the intervention of a licensed attorney. The variable
equals one when legal representation is mandatory, and zero when legal representation is not mandatory.
Index: Professionals vs.
laymen.
The index measures whether the resolution of the case provided would rely mostly in the intervention of professional judges
and attorneys, as opposed to the intervention of other types of adjudicators and lay people. The index is formed by the
normalized sum of the following variables: (i) general jurisdiction court, (ii) professional vs. non-professional judge, and (iii)
legal representation is mandatory. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values mean a higher intervention of
professionals. 
Written  vs. oral elements
Filing The variable equals one if the complaint normally has to be submitted in written form to court, and zero if it can be presented
orally.
Service of process The variable equals one if the defendant’s first official notice on the complaint content is most likely received in writing, and
zero otherwise.
Opposition The variable equals one if under normal circumstances the defendant’s answer to the complaint should be submitted in writing,
and zero if it may be presented orally to court.
Evidence The variable equals one if evidence is mostly submitted to the court in written form, in form of attachments, affidavits, or
otherwise, and equals zero if most of the evidence, included documentary evidence, is presented at oral hearings before the
judge.
Final arguments The variable equals one if final arguments on the case would normally be submitted in writing, and zero if on the contrary they
would likely be presented orally at court before the judge.
Judgment The variable equals one if the final decision for the case is adopted and issued by the judge in written form, and zero if, on the
contrary, it is adopted and issued by the judge in open court at an audience attended by the parties. The defining factor is
whether the judge normally decides the case at the hearing or not.  Therefore, if the judge at the hearing simply reads out the
content of a previously adopted written decision, the variable equals one, and conversely, an orally adopted judgment that is
later transposed into writing for enforcement purposes would still be considered as orally issued and score zero.
Notification of judgment The variable equals one if normally the parties receive their first notice of the content of the final decision in written form,
either by notice mailed to them, publication in a court board or gazette, or through any other written means. The variable equals
zero if they receive their first notice in open court at an audience attended by them.
Enforcement of judgment The variable equals one if the execution procedure is mostly carried out through the compliance of written court orders or
written acts by the enforcement authority, and zero otherwise.
Index: Written vs. oral
elements
The index measures the written or oral nature of the actions involved in the procedure, from the filing of the complaint, until
the actual enforcement.  The index is calculated as the number of  stages carried out mostly in a written form over the total
number of applicable stages, and it ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values mean higher prevalence of written elements. Variable Description
Legal justification
Complaint must be legally
justified
The variable measures whether the complaint is required, by law or court regulation, to include references to the applicable
laws, legal reasoning, or formalities that would normally call for legal training or assistance. The variable equals one for a
legally justified complaint, and zero when the complaint does not require legal justification (specific articles of the law or case-
law).
Judgment must be legally
justified
The variable measures whether the judgment must expressly state the legal justification (articles of the law or case-law) for
the decision. The variable equals one for a legally justified judgment, and zero otherwise.
Judgment must be on law (not
on equity)
The variable measures whether the judgment may be motivated on general equitable arguments, or if it must be founded on
the law. The variable equals one when judgment must be on law only, and zero when judgment may be based on equity
grounds.
Index: Legal justification The index measures the level of legal justification required in the process. The index is formed by the normalized sum of the
following variables : (i) complaint must be legally justified, (ii) judgment must be legally justified, and (iii) judgment must be
on law (not on equity). The index ranges from 0 to 1, where higher values mean a higher use of legal language or justification.
Statutory regulation of evidence
Judge can not introduce
evidence
The variable equals one if, by law, the judge can not freely request or take evidence that has not been requested, offered, or
introduced by the parties, and zero otherwise.
Judge can not reject
irrelevant evidence
The variable equals one if, by law, the judge can not refuse to collect or admit evidence requested by the parties, if she
deems it irrelevant to the case, and zero otherwise.
Out-of-court statements are
inadmissible
The variable equals one if statements of fact that were not directly known or perceived by the witness, but only heard from a
third person, may not be admitted as evidence. The variable equals zero otherwise.
Mandatory pre-qualification
of questions
The variable equals one if, by law, the judge must pre-qualify the questions before they are asked to the witnesses, and zero
otherwise.
Oral interrogation only by
judge
The variable equals one if parties and witnesses can only  be orally interrogated by the judge, and zero if they can be orally
interrogated by the judge and the opposing party. 
Only original documents
and certified copies are
admissible
The variable equals one if only  original documents and "authentic" or "certified" copies are admissible documentary evidence,
and zero if simple or uncertified copies are admissible evidence as well. 
Authenticity and weight of
evidence defined by law
The variable equals one if the authenticity and probative value of documentary evidence is specifically defined by the law. The
variable equals zero if all admissible documentary evidence is freely weighted by the judge.
Mandatory recording of
evidence




The index measures the level of statutory control or intervention of the administration, admissibility, evaluation and recording
of evidence. The index is formed by the normalized sum of the following variables : (i) judge can not introduce evidence, (ii)
judge can not reject irrelevant evidence, (iii) out-of-court statements are inadmissible, (iv) mandatory pre-qualification of
questions, (v) oral interrogation only by judge, (VI) only original documents and certified copies are admissible, (vii)
authenticity and weight of evidence defined by law, and (viii) mandatory recording of evidence. The index ranges from 0 to
1, where higher values mean a higher statutory control or intervention. 
Control of Superior Review
Enforcement of judgment is
automatically suspended
until resolution of the appeal
The variable equals one if the enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until resolution of the appeal, when  a
request for appeal is granted.  The variable equals zero if the suspension of the enforcement of judgment is not automatic, or
if the judgment can not be appealed at all.
Comprehensive review in
appeal
The variable equals one if both issues of law and issues of fact (evidence) can be reviewed by the appellate court. The




The variable equals one if interlocutory appeals are allowed, and zero if they are always prohibited. Interlocutory appeals
are defined as appeals against interlocutory or interim judicial decisions made during the course of a judicial proceeding in
first instance and before final ruling on the entire case.Variable Description
Index: Control of superior
review
The index measures the level of control or intervention of the appellate court’s review of the first-instance judgment. The index
is formed by the normalized sum of the following variables : (i) enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until
resolution of appeal, (ii) comprehensive review in appeal, and (iii) interlocutory appeals are allowed. The index ranges from




The variable equals one if the law requires plaintiff to attempt a pre-trial conciliation or mediation before filing the lawsuit,
and zero otherwise.
Service of process by
judicial officer required
The variable equals one if the law requires the complaint to be served to the defendant through the intervention of a judicial
officer, and zero if service of process may be accomplished by other means. 
Notification of judgment by
judicial officer required
The variable equals one if the law requires the judgment to be notified to the defendant through the intervention of a judicial
officer, and zero if notification of judgment may be accomplished by other means. 
Index: Engagement
formalities
The index measures the formalities required to engage someone into the procedure or to held him/her accountable of the
judgment. The index is formed by the normalized sum of the following variables : (i) mandatory pre-trial conciliation, (ii)
service of process by judicial officer required, and (iii) notification of judgment by judicial officer required. The index ranges
from 0 to 1, where higher values mean a higher statutory control or intervention in the judicial process.
Independent procedural actions
Filing and service The variable equals the total minimum number of independent procedural required to complete the following stages of the
process: filing, admission, attachment, and service.
Trial and judgment The variable equals the total minimum number of independent procedural actions required to complete the following stages
of the process: opposition to the complaint, hearing or trial, evidence, final arguments, and judgment.
Enforcement The variable equals the total minimum number of independent procedural actions required to complete the following stages
of the process: notification of judgment and enforcement of judgment.
Index: Independent
procedural actions
An independent procedural action is defined as a step of the procedure, mandated by law or court regulation, that demands
interaction between the parties or between them and the judge or court officer (e.g., filing a motion, attending a hearing, mailing
a letter, or seizing some goods). We also count as an independent procedural action every judicial or administrative writ or
resolution (e.g., issuing judgment or entering a writ of execution) which is legally required to advance the proceedings until
the enforcement of judgment. Actions are always assumed to be simultaneous if possible, so procedural events that may be
fulfilled in the same day and place are only counted as one action. To form the index, we: (1) add the minimum number of
independent procedural actions required to complete all the stages of the process (from filing of lawsuit to enforcement of
judgment); and (2) normalize this number to fall between zero and one using the minimum and the maximum number of
independent procedural actions across the countries in the sample. The index takes a value of zero for the country with the
minimum number of independent procedural actions, and a value of one for the country with the maximum number of
independent procedural actions.
Formalism  index
Formalism index The index measures substantive and procedural statutory intervention in judicial cases at lower-level civil trial courts, and is
formed by adding up the following indices: (i) professionals vs. laymen, (ii) written vs. oral elements, (iii) legal justification,
(iv) statutory regulation of evidence, (v) control of superior review, (vi) engagement formalities, and (vii) independent
procedural actions. The index ranges from 0 to 7, where 7 means a higher level of control or intervention in the judicial process.
Duration in practice
Duration until completion of
service of process
The variable measures the average duration in calendar days, between the moment the plaintiff files the complaint until the
moment of service of process to the defendant.
Duration of trial The variable measures the average duration, in calendar days, between the moment of service of  process and the moment the
judgment is issued.
Duration of enforcement  The variable measures the average duration, in calendar days, between the moment of issuance of  judgment and the moment
the landlord repossesses the property (for the eviction case) or the creditor obtains payment (for the check collection case).
Total duration The variable measures the total average duration in calendar days of the procedure under the factual and procedural assumptions
provided. It results form the sum of: (i) duration until completion of service of process, (ii) duration of trial, and (iii) duration
of enforcement. Variable Description
Other judicial quality measures
Efficiency of the judicial
system
Assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms” produced
by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR).  It may be “taken to represent investors’ assessment of
conditions in the country in question.”  Average between 1980 and 1983.  Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores representing
lower efficiency levels.  Source: International Country Risk Guide.
Equal access to justice Assessment of the extent to which citizens are “equal under the law, do they have access to an independent, non-disciminatory
judiciary, and are they respected by the security forces”.  Scale from 0 to 10.  The higher the rating the greater the degree of
equality under the law”.  Source: Economic Freedom of the World 1975-1995.
Enforceability of contracts The variable measures “the relative degree to which contractual agreements are honored and complications presented by
language and mentality differences.” Scale for 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating higher enforceability.  Source: Business
Environmental Risk Intelligence.  Exact definition in Knack, Stephen and Philip Keefer, 1995.
Corruption ICR’s assessment of corruption in government.  Lower scores indicate “that high government officials are likely to demand
special  payments” and “illegal payments are generally accepted throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes
connected with import and export licences, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy protection, or loans.”  Average of the
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995.  Scale form 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher
levels of corruption (we changed the scale form the original range going from 0 to 6). Source: International Country Risk
Guide.
Human rights  This is an index of human rights violations for each country coded by Poe and Tate (1994) using the Amnesty International
Reports for 1993. The coding rules used are:
1. Countries are under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or
exceptional...Political murders are extremely rare. (score=4)
2. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected,
torture and beating are exceptional...Political murders are rare. (score=3)
3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political
murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.
(score=2)
4. The practices of [level 3] are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances are a common part of life...In
spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
(score=1)
5. The terror of [level 4] has been expanded to the whole population...The leaders of these societies place no limit on
the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. (score=0). Source: Poe, Tate and
Legal system is fair and
impartial
This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks: “ In resolving
business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to be fair and impartial?” The scale ranges from 1 to 6, where
higher scores mean a fairer and more impartial legal system. Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Legal system is honest or
uncorrupt
This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks: “ In resolving
business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to be honest/uncorrupt?” The scale ranges from 1 to 6, where
a higher score signals a more honest and uncorrupt system.  Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Legal system is quick This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks: “ In resolving
business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to be quick ?” The scale ranges from 1 to 6, where a higher score
means  a quicker legal system. Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Legal system is affordable This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks: “ In resolving
business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to be affordable?” The scale ranges from 1 to 6, where a higher
score means a more affordable legal system. Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Legal system is consistent This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks: “ In resolving
business disputes, do you believe your country’s court system to be consistent?” The scale ranges from 1 to 6, where a higher
score means a more consistent legal system. Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Court decisions are enforced This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks the managers the
degree to which they believe their  country’s court system will enforce its decisions. The scale ranges from 1 to 6, where a
higher score means a  stronger belief that the system will  enforce its decisions more forcefully. Source: World Business
Environment Survey.Variable Description
Confidence in legal system This variable is based on  the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank in the year 2000.
The questionnaire was answered by managers of small firms ( below 50 employees). The questionnaire asks  the managers the
degree to which they believed  the system will uphold contracts and property rights in a business dispute. The scale ranges from
1 to 6, where a higher score means a  higher degree of confidence on the system.  Source: World Business Environment Survey.
Other variables
Log of GNP per capita Logarithm of GNP per capita in 1999, Atlas method,  expressed in current US dollars.  When 1999 income data in US dollars
was not available, the latest available number was used (1996 for Kuwait, 1997 for Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Turks and
Caicos Island, 1998 for Anguilla, Bahrain, Netherlands Antilles, United Arab Emirates).  Income for Anguilla, the British
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Island, Gibraltar, Monaco, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Turks and Caicos Islands is  GDP per
capita (PPP) from the CIA World Factbook.  Source: World Development Indicators.
Legal origin Identifies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country.  Equal 1 of the origin is English common
law, two if the origin is the French commercial code, three if the origin is the German commercial code, four is the origin is
Scandinavian civil law, and five if the origin is Socialist civil law. Source: La Porta, et al. (1999).Table 2A: Eviction of a tenant
This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows the professionals vs. laymen, written vs. oral elements, legal justification, statutory
regulation of evidence, control of superior review, and engagement formalities indices, and the normalized number of independent procedural actions


















Anguilla 0.67 0.88 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.67 0.28 4.28
Australia 0.00 0.57 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.17 1.99
Bahrain 0.33 0.63 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.25 3.92
Bangladesh 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.33 0.28 3.36
Barbados 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.25 2.33
Belize 0.00 0.38 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.00 2.08
Bermuda 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.03 1.32
Botswana 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.67 0.28 4.07
BVI 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.33 2.88
Canada 0.00 0.75 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.19 2.32
Cayman 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.33 0.39 3.60
Cyprus 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.17 3.50
Ghana 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.36 2.69
Gibraltar 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.31 2.51
Grenada 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.11 2.86
Hong Kong 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.25 3.13
India 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.39 3.51
Ireland 0.67 0.71 0.33 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.36 3.20
Israel 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.19 3.90
Jamaica 0.67 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.08 2.38
Kenya 0.33 0.75 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.39 2.85
Malawi 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.14 3.14
Malaysia 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.42 3.21
Namibia 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.19 3.86
New Zealand 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.08 1.25
Nigeria 0.33 0.63 0.33 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.42 3.08
Pakistan 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.53 3.74
Singapore 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.44 3.11
South Africa 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.14 3.68
Sri Lanka 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.22 3.89
St. Vincent 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.67 0.31 3.85
Swaziland 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.19 3.74
Tanzania 0.33 0.63 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.11 2.90
Thailand 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.33 4.25
Trinidad & Tobago 0.67 0.63 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.28 2.15
Turks and Caicos 0.67 0.63 0.00 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.47 2.81
UAE 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.28 1.44
Uganda 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.14 2.51
United Kingdom 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.14 2.22
USA 0.33 0.63 1.00 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.22 2.97
Zambia 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.19 3.07
Zimbabwe 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.11 3.11
Mean 0.48 0.63 0.52 0.30 0.67 0.17 0.25 3.02
Median 0.67 0.63 0.50 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.25 3.10
Socialist legal origin
Bulgaria 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.33 0.39 4.51
China 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.28 3.40
Croatia 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.22 3.43
Czech Republic 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.25 3.54
Estonia 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.67 0.28 4.74
Georgia 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.31 3.51
Hungary 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.25 3.46
Kazakhstan 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.67 4.00
Latvia 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.19 3.86
Lithuania 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.42 4.21
Poland 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.17 4.08
Romania 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.56 4.47
Russia 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.11 3.32
Slovenia 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.47 4.26
Ukraine 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.63 1.00 0.00 0.22 3.60
Vietnam 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.42 2.86
Mean 0.67 0.67 0.79 0.35 0.96 0.06 0.32 3.83
Median 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.28 3.73
French legal origin
Argentina 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.67 0.69 5.49
Belgium 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.33 0.17 3.17
Bolivia 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.67 0.53 5.11
Brazil 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.17 3.83
Chile 1.00 0.88 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.42 4.79
Colombia 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.33 0.69 3.94
Costa Rica 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.36 5.05
Cote D'Ivoire 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.22 3.64
















Ecuador 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.33 0.47 4.64
Egypt 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.14 3.60
El Salvador 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.67 0.17 4.25
France 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.13 0.67 0.67 0.06 3.60
Greece 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.67 0.14 4.31
Guatemala 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.67 0.36 5.78
Honduras 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.33 0.39 4.68
Indonesia 0.33 0.88 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.50 3.88
Italy 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.67 0.11 4.24
Jordan 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.58 3.38
Kuwait 0.33 0.88 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.14 4.60
Lebanon 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.53 5.57
Luxembourg 0.33 0.86 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.31 3.66
Malta 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.08 3.42
Mexico 0.33 0.88 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.78 4.82
Monaco 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.25 0.33 0.67 0.06 2.93
Morocco 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.67 0.17 4.79
Mozambique 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.67 0.36 5.15
Netherlands 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.25 3.00
Netherlands Antilles 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.42 3.63
Panama 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.67 1.00 5.92
Paraguay 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.61 5.09
Peru 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.67 0.50 5.42
Philippines 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.67 0.50 5.00
Portugal 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.42 4.54
Senegal 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.31 3.89
Spain 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.31 4.81
Tunisia 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.22 3.89
Turkey 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.44 3.49
Uruguay 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.69 3.99
Venezuela 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.64 5.81
Mean 0.72 0.81 0.83 0.42 0.69 0.53 0.38 4.38
Median 0.67 0.87 1.00 0.44 0.67 0.67 0.36 4.33
German legal origin
Austria 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.31 3.62
Germany 0.33 0.88 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.39 3.76
Japan 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.14 3.72
Korea 0.67 0.88 0.33 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.33 3.33
Switzerland 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.33 0.08 3.96
Taiwan 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.17 3.04
Mean 0.61 0.79 0.83 0.27 0.72 0.11 0.24 3.57
Median 0.67 0.87 1.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.24 3.67
Scandinavian legal origin
Denmark 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.39 3.60
Finland 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.11 2.53
Iceland 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.06 3.47
Norway 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.33 0.17 3.71
Sweden 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.31 3.31
Mean 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.23 0.87 0.13 0.21 3.32
Median 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.17 3.47
Mean  for  all countries 0.58 0.71 0.68 0.33 0.71 0.27 0.31 3.68
Median for  all countries 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.28 3.63
Tests of means (t-stats)















Common vs. German -1.31 -2.53
b -2.29
b 0.50 -0.54 0.70 0.22 -1.74
c
Common vs. Scandinavian -1.10 0.01 -0.98 1.20 -1.77
c 0.42 0.72 -0.86
Socialist vs. French -0.78 -3.14




Socialist vs. German 1.71 -1.68 -0.28 1.31 4.12
a -0.57 1.29 1.10
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 1.90
c 0.65 0.80 2.07
c 1.36 -0.76 1.57 1.93
c










German vs. Scandinavian 0.13 1.48 1.06 0.59 -1.51 -0.21 0.39 1.04
Tests of medians (z-stats)














Common vs. German -1.29 -2.00
b -2.17
b 0.68 -0.47 0.64 0.20 -1.75
c
Common vs. Scandinavian -1.06 -0.30 -1.03 1.45 -1.79
c 0.33 0.73 -0.85
Socialist vs. French -0.98 -2.78




Socialist vs. German 1.63 -1.60 -0.21 1.27 3.10
a -0.99 1.14 0.88
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 1.79
c 0.40 1.22 1.95
c 1.33 -1.21 1.49 1.53










German vs. Scandinavian 0.14 1.57 1.18 0.48 -1.42 -0.22 0.46 1.28
a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% level.Table 2B : Collection of a check
This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows the professionals vs. laymen, written vs. oral elements, legal justification, statutory
regulation of evidence, control of superior review, and engagement formalities indices, and the normalized number of independent procedural actions


















Anguilla 0.00 0.38 0.33 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.13 1.96
Australia 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.05 1.80
Bahrain 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.33 0.24 4.40
Bangladesh 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.16 3.24
Barbados 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.33 0.08 2.37
Belize 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.42
Bermuda 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.16 1.78
Botswana 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.67 0.29 4.08
BVI 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.11 2.52
Canada 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.21 2.09
Cayman 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.21 2.75
Cyprus 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.34 3.68
Ghana 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.32 2.65
Gibraltar 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.18 2.39
Grenada 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.05 2.80
Hong Kong 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.73
India 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.34 3.34
Ireland 0.67 0.57 0.33 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.26 2.63
Israel 0.33 0.88 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.26 3.30
Jamaica 0.67 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.05 2.34
Kenya 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.42 3.09
Malawi 0.67 0.63 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.33 0.08 2.95
Malaysia 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.34 2.34
Namibia 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.16 3.82
New Zealand 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.08 1.58
Nigeria 0.33 0.63 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.53 3.19
Pakistan 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.55 3.76
Singapore 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.29 2.50
South Africa 0.00 0.38 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.05 1.68
Sri Lanka 0.67 0.86 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.21 3.78
St. Vincent 1.00 0.43 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.16 3.63
Swaziland 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.16 3.70
Tanzania 0.67 0.86 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.13 3.82
Thailand 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.26 3.14
Trinidad & Tobago 0.33 0.63 0.00 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.26 1.80
Turks and Caicos 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.24 1.86
UAE 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.47 3.81
Uganda 0.00 0.71 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.18 2.61
United Kingdom 0.67 0.71 0.33 0.13 0.67 0.00 0.08 2.58
USA 0.33 0.75 0.33 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.08 2.62
Zambia 0.00 0.57 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.18 2.13
Zimbabwe 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.11 3.11
Mean 0.43 0.58 0.42 0.31 0.68 0.13 0.20 2.76
Median 0.33 0.63 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.18 2.64
Socialist legal origin
Bulgaria 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.33 0.45 4.57
China 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.29 3.41
Croatia 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.29 3.62
Czech Republic 0.67 0.83 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.18 4.06
Estonia 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.24 4.36
Georgia 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.21 3.09
Hungary 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.21 3.42
Kazakhstan 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.33 0.84 4.76
Latvia 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.26 3.93
Lithuania 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.55 4.47
Poland 0.67 0.88 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.24 4.15
Romania 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 4.42
Russia 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.18 3.39
Slovenia 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.34 4.26
Ukraine 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.63 1.00 0.00 0.29 3.66
Vietnam 0.67 0.50 0.33 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.50 3.25
Mean 0.67 0.72 0.79 0.38 0.96 0.06 0.35 3.93
Median 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 0.29 3.99
French legal origin
Argentina 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.13 1.00 0.67 0.61 5.40
Belgium 0.33 0.75 0.33 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.18 2.73
Bolivia 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.38 1.00 1.00 0.71 5.75
Brazil 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.18 3.06
Chile 1.00 0.75 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.32 4.57
Colombia 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 0.33 0.74 4.11
Costa Rica 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.32 5.48
Cote D'Ivoire 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.67 0.24 3.65
















Ecuador 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.33 0.63 4.92
Egypt 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.21 3.79
El Salvador 0.33 0.88 1.00 0.88 0.67 0.67 0.18 4.60
France 0.33 0.75 1.00 0.13 0.33 0.67 0.03 3.23
Greece 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.67 0.16 3.99
Guatemala 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.67 0.26 5.68
Honduras 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.33 0.61 4.90
Indonesia 0.33 0.88 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.53 3.90
Italy 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.18 4.04
Jordan 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.61 3.52
Kuwait 0.67 0.88 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.67 0.21 3.88
Lebanon 1.00 0.75 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.33 0.47 4.85
Luxembourg 0.33 0.71 0.67 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.34 3.56
Malta 0.00 0.63 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.11 2.44
Mexico 0.33 0.88 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.33 1.00 4.71
Monaco 0.33 0.71 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.67 0.11 2.74
Morocco 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.21 4.71
Mozambique 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.24 4.49
Netherlands 0.33 0.63 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.32 3.07
Netherlands Antilles 0.67 0.88 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.39 2.85
Panama 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.67 0.92 5.84
Paraguay 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.95 5.91
Peru 1.00 0.88 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.67 0.68 5.60
Philippines 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.67 0.50 5.00
Portugal 0.67 0.75 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.34 3.93
Senegal 0.67 0.88 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.55 4.72
Spain 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.29 5.25
Tunisia 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.67 0.13 4.05
Turkey 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.24 2.53
Uruguay 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.76 4.05
Venezuela 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.84 6.01
Mean 0.68 0.85 0.80 0.42 0.63 0.49 0.41 4.29
Median 0.67 0.88 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.32 4.10
German legal origin
Austria 0.67 0.86 1.00 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.29 3.52
Germany 0.33 0.88 1.00 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.13 3.51
Japan 0.33 0.88 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.18 2.98
Korea 0.67 0.88 0.33 0.13 0.67 0.33 0.37 3.37
Switzerland 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.38 0.33 0.33 0.13 3.13
Taiwan 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.38 0.33 0.00 0.16 2.37
Mean 0.50 0.77 0.72 0.33 0.50 0.11 0.21 3.15
Median 0.50 0.87 0.67 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.17 3.25
Scandinavian legal origin
Denmark 0.33 0.63 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.33 0.13 2.55
Finland 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.26 3.14
Iceland 0.67 0.63 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.33 0.13 4.13
Norway 0.33 0.75 0.67 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.08 2.95
Sweden 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.00 0.32 2.98
Mean 0.53 0.68 0.53 0.23 0.87 0.13 0.18 3.15
Median 0.67 0.63 0.67 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.13 2.98
Mean  for all countries 0.57 0.71 0.64 0.36 0.70 0.25 0.30 3.53
Median for all countries 0.67 0.75 0.67 0.38 0.67 0.33 0.24 3.52
Tests of means (t-stats)















Common vs. German -0.59 -2.73
a -2.25
b -0.37 1.84
c 0.30 -0.11 -1.12
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.79 -1.35 -0.75 1.22 -1.70
c 0.02 0.33 -1.03
Socialist vs. French -0.21 -3.05
a -0.12 -0.74 4.07
a -6.47
a -0.92 -1.36
Socialist vs. German 3.81




Socialist vs. Scandinavian 3.11
a 0.93 1.71 2.35
b 1.36 -0.95 1.95
c 2.81
b











German vs .Scandinavian -0.30 1.17 0.99 1.51 -3.32
a -0.21 0.44 -0.02
Tests of medians (z-stats)















Common vs. German -0.55 -2.40
b -2.15
b -0.47 1.95
c 0.26 -0.38 -1.09
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.79 -1.54 -0.74 1.39 -1.75
c -0.04 0.17 -1.02
Socialist vs. French -0.63 -2.82
a 0.08 -0.98 4.11
a -4.90
a -0.55 -1.29
Socialist vs. German 2.97




Socialist vs Scandinavian 2.60
a 1.26 1.51 2.14
b 1.33 -0.95 1.95
c 2.48
b












German vs .Scandinavian -0.32 1.23 0.87 1.43 -2.35
b -0.22 0.75 0.37






















Panel A:  Eviction
Professionals vs. laymen 0.6420
a 1.0000






Statutory regulation of evidence 0.4161
a 0.1471 0.2390 0.2049 1.0000
Control of superior review 0.4573
a 0.2342 0.1009 0.2121 0.0090 1.0000
Engagement formalities 0.5988
a 0.2349 0.4041
a 0.2795 0.1995 0.0037 1.0000
Independent procedural actions 0.5353
a 0.3952
a 0.3858
a 0.1799 0.1546 0.1110 0.1717 1.0000
Panel B: Check
Professionals vs. laymen 0.7625
a 1.0000











Control of superior review 0.3264





c 0.2296 -0.0296 1.0000




b 0.2869 0.0957 0.2909
c 1.0000
Panel C: Correlations between eviction and check indices
Formalism index 0.8257
a
Professionals vs. laymen 0.5229
a




Statutory regulation of evidence 0.9086
a




Independent procedural actions 0.8575
a
a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% levelTable 4: Eviction of a tenant and check collection by legal origin and income level
This table classifies countries by GNP per capita and shows the formalism index for the case of eviction of a tenant and the case of
collection of a check. All variables are described in Table 1.
All countries English legal origin countries French legal origin countries
By GNP per capita level Eviction Check Eviction Check Eviction Check
Low income - bottom 25 percentile
Mean 3.69 3.76 3.20 3.18 4.44 4.58
Median 3.60 3.68 3.11 3.19 4.66 4.71
Number of countries 28 28 13 13 10 10
Medium income - middle 50 percentile
Mean 3.95 3.73 3.18 2.71 4.59 4.46
Median 3.91 3.93 3.35 2.45 4.54 4.57
Number of countries 54 54 18 18 23 23
High income - top 75 percentile
Mean 3.14 2.88 2.53 2.33 3.60 3.32
Median 3.20 2.95 2.51 2.50 3.60 3.23
Number of countries 27 27 11 11 7 7
All countries
Mean 3.68 3.53 3.02 2.76 4.38 4.29
Median 3.63 3.52 3.10 2.64 4.33 4.10
Number of countries 109 109 42 42 40 40
Tests of means (t-stats)
Bottom 25 vs. middle 50 -1.20 0.12 0.07 1.65 -0.52 0.34













Tests of medians (z-stats)
Bottom 25 vs. middle 50 -1.51 -0.08 -0.28 1.56 -0.47 0.16













a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% level.Table 5: Indices regressions 
Panel A: Eviction of a tenant
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of countries for the case of eviction of a tenant. The dependent variables  are the indices
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a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% levelTable 5: Indices regressions
Panel B:  Check collection
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of countries for the case of check collection. The dependent variables  are the indices
of formalism and its component indices.  Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. All variables are described in Table 1.
Independent variables: 











































































































































































































































a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% levelTable 6: Duration in practice
This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows the duration in practice for the eviction and the check case. All variables are described
in Table 1.
Eviction of a tenant Check collection
By legal origin Duration until completion
of service of process
Duration of trial Duration of
enforcement









Anguilla 1 60 30 91 1 30 7 38
Australia 3 35 6 44 25 160 135 320
Bahrain 41 120 224 385 54 114 200 368
Bangladesh 30 180 180 390 30 180 60 270
Barbados 4 67 21 92 2 49 60 111
Belize 30 15 14 59 30 15 15 60
Bermuda 4 25 21 50 4 100 21 125
Botswana 14 42 7 63 14 42 21 77
BVI 2 42 14 58 42 21 120 183
Canada 5 21 17 43 21 250 150 421
Cayman 30 136 14 180 30 60 30 120
Cyprus 60 120 180 360 60 120 180 360
Ghana 20 140 90 250 20 52 18 90
Gibraltar 160 50 14 224 160 50 14 224
Grenada 15 90 75 180 8 90 30 128
Hong Kong 7 35 150 192 7 40 14 61
India 142 24 46 212 7 53 46 106
Ireland 11 60 50 121 11 60 60 130
Israel 3 272 135 410 60 120 135 315
Jamaica 45 46 14 105 45 87 70 202
Kenya 12 122 121 255 12 122 121 255
Malawi 3 30 2 35 3 90 15 108
Malaysia 60 90 120 270 15 15 60 90
Namibia 11 25 83 118 11 25 83 118
New Zealand 10 40 30 80 10 30 20 60
Nigeria 32 126 208 366 81 100 60 241
Pakistan 60 245 60 365 60 185 120 365
Singapore 9 40 11 60 11 18 19 47
South Africa 10 189 10 209 10 60 14 84
Sri Lanka 90 440 200 730 60 200 180 440
St. Vincent 3 302 30 335 3 22 10 35
Swaziland 5 28 7 40 5 28 7 40
Tanzania 7 180 30 217 7 90 30 127
Thailand 30 510 90 630 30 90 90 210
Trinidad & Tobago 54 103 35 192 51 101 42 194
Turks and Caicos 14 100 60 174 14 30 30 74
UAE 14 180 90 285 14 365 180 559
Uganda 1 7 21 29 14 40 45 99
United Kingdom 14 73 28 115 14 73 14 101
USA 6 33 10 49 23 17 14 54
Zambia 14 90 7 111 14 120 54 188
Zimbabwe 8 180 9 197 8 180 9 197
Mean 26 112 61 199 26 88 62 176
Median 13 82 30 180 14 67 44 126
Socialist legal origin
Bulgaria 60 450 150 660 10 250 150 410
China 15 105 60 180 15 120 45 180
Croatia 60 180 90 330 60 180 90 330
Czech Republic 60 90 180 330 30 60 180 270
Estonia 59 136 110 305 59 136 110 305
Georgia 30 60 90 180 30 60 90 180
Hungary 90 185 90 365 90 185 90 365
Kazakhstan 10 50 60 120 10 50 60 120
Latvia 27 41 11 79 28 41 120 189
Lithuania 30 90 30 150 30 60 60 150
Poland 90 720 270 1080 90 730 180 1000
Romania 30 140 103 273 30 105 90 225
Russia 10 90 30 130 10 90 60 160
Slovenia 133 510 360 1003 133 510 360 1003
Ukraine 14 90 120 224 14 90 120 224
Vietnam 35 55 60 150 35 35 50 120
Mean 47 187 113 347 42 169 116 327
Median 33 98 90 248 30 98 90 224
French legal origin
Argentina 60 300 80 440 20 200 80 300
Belgium 3 60 57 120 0 20 100 120
Bolivia 14 60 20 94 14 360 90 464
Brazil 30 60 30 120 30 90 60 180
Chile 15 200 25 240 15 140 45 200
Colombia 139 279 82 500 165 216 146 527
Costa Rica 20 90 30 140 10 180 180 370
Cote D'Ivoire 8 120 2 130 8 82 60 150
Dominican Republic 30 90 90 210 35 90 90 215
Ecuador 38 40 30 108 38 235 60 333
Egypt 7 180 45 232 7 150 45 202
El Salvador 45 60 45 150 25 15 20 60
France 16 75 135 226 16 75 90 181Eviction of a tenant Check collection
By legal origin Duration until completion
of service of process
Duration of trial Duration of
enforcement








Greece 32 35 180 247 180 45 90 315
Guatemala 10 180 90 280 10 120 90 220
Honduras 15 30 30 75 30 90 105 225
Indonesia 30 165 30 225 30 165 30 225
Italy 0 450 180 630 0 415 230 645
Jordan 7 100 30 137 7 100 40 147
Kuwait 3 65 25 93 7 240 110 357
Lebanon 1 912 60 973 1 540 180 721
Luxembourg 20 120 240 380 15 45 150 210
Malta 30 610 90 730 30 365 150 545
Mexico 20 60 100 180 33 99 151 283
Monaco 17 86 16 119 24 26 16 66
Morocco 15 365 365 745 15 135 42 192
Mozambique 30 450 60 540 30 300 210 540
Netherlands 17 7 28 52 17 7 15 39
Netherlands Antilles 15 70 20 105 20 36 37 93
Panama 36 50 48 134 76 86 35 197
Paraguay 12 50 140 202 25 32 165 222
Peru 41 135 70 246 81 135 165 441
Philippines 42 97 25 164 42 97 25 164
Portugal 20 280 30 330 20 280 120 420
Senegal 5 60 90 155 5 150 180 335
Spain 60 55 68 183 49 69 29 147
Tunisia 3 28 2 33 3 1 3 7
Turkey 30 180 90 300 30 30 45 105
Uruguay 120 120 90 330 150 120 90 360
Venezuela 30 300 30 360 30 300 30 360
Mean 27 167 72 266 34 147 90 272
Median 20 94 53 206 22 110 90 221
German legal origin
Austria 7 360 180 547 14 270 150 434
Germany 29 191 111 331 29 61 64 154
Japan 3 350 10 363 3 47 10 60
Korea 30 180 93 303 20 40 15 75
Switzerland 16 180 70 266 59 75 90 224
Taiwan 30 120 180 330 30 60 120 210
Mean 19 230 107 357 26 92 75 193
Median 23 186 102 331 25 61 77 182
Scandinavian legal origin
Denmark 20 180 25 225 15 40 28 83
Finland 15 70 35 120 35 145 60 240
Iceland 22 12 30 64 71 105 75 251
Norway 7 300 58 365 7 50 30 87
Sweden 6 135 19 160 6 165 19 190
Mean 14 139 33 187 27 101 42 170
Median 15 135 30 160 15 105 30 190
Mean for all countries 29 151 74 254 31 122 80 234
Median for all countries 17 97 57 202 20 90 60 197
Tests of means (t-stats)













Common vs. German 0.47 -2.49
b -1.65 -2.36
b 0.03 -0.13 -0.52 -0.30
Common vs. Scandinavian 0.76 -0.52 0.95 0.17 -0.05 -0.39 0.76 0.10
Socialist vs. French 2.23
b 0.37 1.80
c 1.14 0.71 0.51 1.33 0.91
Socialist vs. German 1.90
c -0.51 0.15 -0.07 1.06 0.94 1.18 1.12
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 2.08
c 0.51 1.91
c 1.14 0.88 0.78 2.05
c 1.23
French vs. German 0.68 -0.83 -1.14 -1.03 0.45 1.04 0.57 1.10
French vs. Scandinavian 1.03 0.33 1.23 0.83 0.35 0.82 1.72
c 1.33
German vs. Scandinavian 0.82 1.43 2.44
b 2.63
b -0.08 -0.19 1.19 0.32
Tests of medians (z-stats)














Common vs. German -0.22 -2.68
a -1.59 -2.46
b -0.48 -0.11 -0.58 -0.39
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.05 -0.66 0.05 -0.26 -0.14 -0.81 0.05 -0.17
Socialist vs. French 2.18
b 0.58 2.13
b 0.95 1.38 0.01 1.36 0.15
Socialist vs. German 1.93
c -1.70
c -0.37 -1.26 1.04 1.07 0.93 1.22
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 2.36
b 0.21 2.49
b 1.08 1.00 0.50 2.62
a 1.24
French vs. German 0.56 -1.98
b -1.56 -2.12
b 0.07 1.22 0.59 1.04
French vs. Scandinavian 1.05 -0.16 1.43 0.70 0.31 0.34 1.83
c 1.19
German vs. Scandinavian 0.83 1.47 1.83
c 1.83
c 0.00 -0.46 0.73 -0.37
a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% level.Table 7: Other outcomes
This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows other outcomes that might be related to judicial efficiency for the eviction of a tenant
























Mean 7.94 3.93 6.56 6.28 3.79 4.02 3.87 2.78 3.23 3.52 3.76 4.03
Median 8.00 3.75 7.09 5.95 4.00 3.98 3.82 2.48 3.21 3.35 3.71 4.13
Socialist legal origin
Mean . 6.88 4.85 6.37 3.50 3.08 2.95 2.28 3.13 2.97 3.40 3.46
Median . 7.50 5.00 6.53 3.50 2.87 2.80 2.27 3.21 2.79 3.39 3.43
French legal origin
Mean 6.61 3.09 5.30 5.41 3.28 3.08 3.07 2.01 2.94 2.88 3.31 3.77
Median 6.58 2.50 4.91 5.00 3.00 3.07 2.88 1.88 2.84 2.80 3.13 4.00
German legal origin
Mean 8.90 7.08 7.50 8.03 4.50 3.76 3.92 2.44 2.16 2.92 3.04 3.69
Median 9.50 7.50 7.91 8.54 4.50 3.76 3.92 2.44 2.16 2.92 3.04 3.69
Scandinavian legal
Mean 10.00 10.00 8.12 10.00 4.80 4.16 4.65 2.57 3.20 3.86 3.33 4.16
Median 10.00 10.00 8.25 10.00 5.00 4.16 4.65 2.57 3.20 3.86 3.33 4.16
Mean for all countries 7.55 4.35 6.07 6.24 3.97 3.43 3.35 2.34 3.07 3.13 3.48 3.79
Median for all countries 7.25 5.00 5.57 5.73 4.00 3.51 3.33 2.26 3.09 3.04 3.47 3.89
Tests of means (t-stats)
Common vs. Socialist n.a. -1.79
c 2.13

















Common vs. German -0.96 -2.25
b -1.20 -1.86
c -1.24 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.




a -1.62 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Socialist vs. French n.a. 2.24
b -0.86 1.22 0.25 0.00 -0.46 1.57 1.06 0.48 0.39 -1.71
c
Socialist vs. German n.a. -0.15 -3.87
a -2.08
c -2.12
c n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.




b n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.





b n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.





b n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
German vs. Scandinavian -1.30 -2.63
b -0.89 -2.61
b -0.98 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tests of medians (z-stats)
Common vs. Socialist n.a. -1.74
c 1.85







Common vs. French 2.58
a 1.08 2.00







Common vs. German -0.90 -2.18
b -1.07 -1.91
c -1.01 0.60 -0.45 0.30 1.66
c 1.21 1.36 0.68




c -0.60 -1.21 -0.15 0.08 -0.75 1.21 -0.15
Socialist vs. French n.a. 2.17
b -0.09 1.41 0.29 0.25 -0.19 2.38
b 1.40 0.54 0.44 -1.64
Socialist vs. German n.a. -0.52 -2.58
a -1.86
c -1.64 -1.04 -1.62 -0.69 1.39 -0.23 0.23 -0.46




c -1.62 -1.62 -1.04 0.23 -1.62 0.00 -1.39





b -1.11 -1.05 -1.30 1.42 -0.31 0.50 0.19





b -1.42 -1.55 -1.42 -0.56 -1.42 -0.31 -0.80
German vs. Scandinavian -1.75
c -2.56
b -0.43 -2.49
b -0.98 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% level.
n.a.=not applicable due to lack of observations; .=missingTable 8: Outcomes and the formalism index (OLS regressions)
Panel A: Eviction of a tenant
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of countries for the case of eviction of a tenant.  Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.  All variables are described in Table 1.
Independent variables: 
































































































































































a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% levelTable 8: Outcomes and the formalism index (OLS regressions)
Panel B: Check collection
Ordinary least squares regressions of the cross-section of countries for the case of check collection.  Robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses.  All variables are described in Table 1.
Independent variables: 






























































































































































a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level; c=significant at 10% levelTable 9: Outcomes and the formalism index (instrumental variables regressions)
Panel A: Eviction of a tenant
Instrumental variables regressions of the cross-section of countries for the case of eviction of a tenant.  The first stage
regression (not shown) has the formalism index as the dependent variable and the independent variables are: (a) the
log of GNP per capita; (b) the set of legal origin dummies; and (c) a constant term.  Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.  All variables are described in Table 1.
Independent variables: 
Dependent variables: Log GNP per
capita


































































































































































a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level ; c=significant at 10% levelTable 9: Outcomes and the formalism index (instrumental variables regressions)
Panel B: Check collection
Instrumental variables regressions of the cross-section of countries for the case of check collection.  The first stage
regression (not shown) has the formalism index as the dependent variable and the independent variables are: (a) the
log of GNP per capita; (b) the set of legal origin dummies; and (c) a constant term.  Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.  All variables are described in Table 1.
Independent variables: 
Dependent variables: Log GNP per
capita






























































































































































a=significant at 1% level; b=significant at 5% level ; c=significant at 10% levelAppendix 1. Mapping between the “International Encyclopaedia of Laws – Civil Procedure,” and the variables and indices in the paper
This table compares the coverage of all the variables and indices in the paper with the table of contents of the Encyclopedia of Laws – Civil Procedure (French
monograph). The first column shows the different parts of the “International Encyclopaedia of Laws-Civil Procedure.” The second column gives the names of the
variables in the paper that are related to the chapter in the encyclopedia. The last column indicates if the variables in the second column belong to the Formalism
Index (FI); to other determinants of judicial efficiency (Other), which are not reported in this version but are available from the authors; or to variables that are
outcomes in the paper (Outcomes).   
Encyclopedia of Laws – Civil
Procedure (France)
Variables in the paper  Indices in the paper
Part I. Judicial organization
       1.  The courts and their members
       2.  The bar 
       3.  Law officials
Variable: Professional vs. non-professional judge
Variable: Legal representation is mandatory
Variable: Service of process by judicial officer required
Variable: Notification of judgment by judicial officer required
FI: Professionals vs. laymen




       1.  Domestic jurisdiction
       2.  International jurisdiction
Variable: General jurisdiction court
Not covered: Lex Mundi Project analyzed simple local disputes only
FI: Professionals vs. laymen
Part III: Actions and claims
       1.  Actions
       2.  Claims and defenses
       3.  Sanctions and procedural
irregularities
Not covered: Right to sue assumed by case facts. 
                      Collective actions outside of scope of Lex mundi Project, which
analyzed simple local disputes only.
Variables: Filing and opposition
Variable: Complaint must be legally justified
Variables: Mandatory time limits
FI: Written vs. oral elements
FI: Legal justification
Other: Mandatory time limits
Part IV: Proceedings
        1. Pre-trial proceedings:
Conciliation before trial
        2. Proceedings in first instance
         
         3. Review proceedings (appeal)
Variable: Mandatory pre-trial conciliation
Variables: Filing, service, opposition, final arguments, judgment, notification
of judgment. 
Variable: Complaint must be legally justified
Variable: Judgment must be legally justified
Variable: Judgment must be on law (not on equity)
Variable: Independent procedural actions for filing and service
Variable: Independent procedural actions for trial and judgment
Variable: Duration of filing and service
Variable: Duration of trial and judgment
Variable: Service of process by judicial officer required
Variable: Notification of judgment by judicial officer required
Variable: Defendant’s economic situation is considered at judgment
Variable: Enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until
resolution of the appeal
Variable: Comprehensive review in appeal
Variable: Interlocutory appeals are allowed
FI: Engagement formalities




FI: Independent procedural actions
FI: Independent procedural actions
Outcomes: Duration in practice




FI: Control of superior review
FI: Control of superior review
FI: Control of superior reviewEncyclopedia of Laws – Civil
Procedure (France)
Variables in the paper  Indices in the paper
Part V: Incidents Mostly not covered: Outside standardized facts included in questionnaire
Variable: Interlocutory appeals are allowed FI: Control of superior review
Part VI: Legal costs and legal aid
         1. Legal costs
         2. Legal aid 
Variable: Legal representation is mandatory
Variable: Attorney fees are fixed or limited by statute, court or administrative
regulation
Variable: Most common remuneration of litigation attorneys
Variable: Quota litis or contingent fee agreements
Variable: Looser pays rule
Variable: Fully compensatory interests
Variable: Mandatory legal aid available by law or by order of the court








         1. Burden of proof
         2. Admissibility of evidence
         3. Administration of evidence
Variable: Authenticity and weight of evidence defined by law
Variable: Judge has the independent legal obligation to investigate facts
Variable: Judge can not introduce evidence
Variable: Judge can not reject irrelevant evidence
Variable: Out-of-court statements are inadmissible
Variable: Only original documents and certified copies are admissible
Variable: Mandatory pre-qualification of questions
Variable: Mandatory recording of evidence 
Variable: Oral interrogation only by judge
Variable: Evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
Other: Defendant protection
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Statutory regulation of evidence
FI: Written vs. oral elements
Part VIII: Particular proceedings Not covered: Lex Mundi Project covered only eviction and check collection
proceedings
Part IX: Enforcement of judgments and
preliminary seizure for security
        1. Enforcement of domestic
judgments
                     2. Protective measures
                     3. Recognition and enforcement     
         of foreign judgments
Variable: Independent procedural actions for enforcement of judgment
Variable: Duration of enforcement of judgment
Variable: Enforcement of judgment. 
Variable: Defendant’s economic situation is considered at enforcement of
judgment
Variable: Enforcement of judgment is automatically suspended until
resolution of the appeal.
Variable: Transfer of debtor’s property only through public auction
Variable: Mandatory exclusion of defendant’s essential survival assets
Variable: Attachment of debtor’s property only after judgment
Not covered: Lex Mundi Project analyzed simple local disputes only
FI: Independent procedural actions
Outcomes: Duration in practice 
FI: Written vs. oral elements 
Other: Defendant protection




Part X: Arbitration  Not covered: Lex Mundi Project focused on judicial procedures
Variable: Administrative procedures Other: Other determinants Formalism index







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anguilla 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10111 0.88 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0 0001 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0.67 7 6 4 17 0.28 4.28
Australia 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 0 n.a 0 0 1 0.57 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0000 0.25 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 5 4 13 0.17 1.99
Bahrain 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 01101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 5 3 8 16 0.25 3.92
Bangladesh 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0 0100 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 8 4 5 17 0.28 3.36
Barbados 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00001 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 1 0 0000 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 5 6 5 16 0.25 2.33
Belize 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 00001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 1 2 7 0.00 2.08
Bermuda 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00001 0.38 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 3 1 4 8 0.03 1.32
Botswana 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10101 0.75 1 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0100 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 0.67 6 7 4 17 0.28 4.07
BVI 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00001 0.50 1 0 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 7 6 6 19 0.33 2.88
Canada 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 00111 0.75 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 1 0 0 0.33 1 0 0 0.33 4 6 4 14 0.19 2.32
Cayman 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00011 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0.33 7 9 5 21 0.39 3.60
Cyprus 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 6 4 3 13 0.17 3.50
Ghana 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00001 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 1 0 0101 0.50 0 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 9 4 7 20 0.36 2.69
Gibraltar 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10011 0.75 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0001 0.13 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 8 4 6 18 0.31 2.51
Grenada 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 5 1 5 11 0.11 2.86
Hong Kong 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 10101 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0000 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 8 4 16 0.25 3.13
India 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 10101 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 8 7 6 21 0.39 3.51
Ireland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 n.a 1 0 1 0.71 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0000 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 7 5 20 0.36 3.20
Israel 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0 0101 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 3 7 4 14 0.19 3.90
Jamaica 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00001 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 3 3 10 0.08 2.38
Kenya 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 00111 0.75 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 5 9 7 21 0.39 2.85
Malawi 1 0 0 0.33 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0.33 5 2 5 12 0.14 3.14
Malaysia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 0 0 1 0.33 1 1 1 0 0001 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 9 9 22 0.42 3.21
Namibia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10001 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 4 5 5 14 0.19 3.86
New Zealand 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 00101 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0000 0.00 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 3 1 6 10 0.08 1.25
Nigeria 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 00101 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 10 6 6 22 0.42 3.08
Pakistan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10001 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 11 10 5 26 0.53 3.74
Singapore 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10001 0.63 1 0 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 9 7 7 23 0.44 3.11
South Africa 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00001 0.50 1 0 1 0.67 1 0 0 0 0011 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 5 4 3 12 0.14 3.68
Sri Lanka 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 5 3 15 0.22 3.89
St. Vincent 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10000 0.50 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 1 0 0001 0.38 1 0 1 0.67 1 1 0 0.67 5 7 6 18 0.31 3.85
Swaziland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10001 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 4 6 4 14 0.19 3.74
Tanzania 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 0 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0101 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 6 2 3 11 0.11 2.90
Thailand 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 8 6 5 19 0.33 4.25
Trinidad & Tobago 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 7 5 5 17 0.28 2.15
Turks and Caicos 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10001 0.63 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 7 10 7 24 0.47 2.81
UAE 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 00001 0.50 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0000 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 0 0.33 3 9 5 17 0.28 1.44
Uganda 0 0 0 0.00 1 n.a n.a n.a n.a 1 n.a 1 1.00 0 0 1 0.33 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 1 6 5 12 0.14 2.51
United Kingdom 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10101 0.75 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0000 0.00 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 3 5 4 12 0.14 2.22
USA 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0000 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 6 3 6 15 0.22 2.97
Zambia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00001 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 7 2 5 14 0.19 3.07
Zimbabwe 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 10001 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 4 4 3 11 0.11 3.11
Mean 0.60 0.83 0.00 0.48 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.32 0.08 0.52 0.20 0.98 0.63 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.38 0.10 0.74 0.02 0.00 0.38 0.02 0.76 0.30 0.33 0.76 0.90 0.67 0.14 0.33 0.05 0.17 5.69 5.29 4.95 15.93 0.25 3.02
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.50 5.00 16.00 0.25 3.10
Socialist Legal Origin
Bulgaria 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0100 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 7 7 7 21 0.39 4.51
China 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0011 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 5 6 6 17 0.28 3.40
Croatia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0011 0.25 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 7 4 4 15 0.22 3.43
Czech Republic 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 5 4 16 0.25 3.54
Estonia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0101 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0.67 9 4 4 17 0.28 4.74
Georgia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0 0101 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 5 5 18 0.31 3.51
Hungary 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0001 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 6 4 6 16 0.25 3.46
Kazakhstan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0 0100 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 17 7 31 0.67 4.00
Latvia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 2 5 14 0.19 3.86
Lithuania 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0111 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 10 3 9 22 0.42 4.21
Poland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 10101 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0101 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 4 5 4 13 0.17 4.08
Romania 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0011 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 10 9 27 0.56 4.47
Russia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00101 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 0 0000 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 4 3 4 11 0.11 3.32
Slovenia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 9 8 7 24 0.47 4.26
Ukraine 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 1 0 1101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 3 5 15 0.22 3.60
Vietnam 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00101 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0100 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 9 6 7 22 0.42 2.83
Mean 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.06 0.06 0.94 0.56 1.00 0.67 0.63 0.94 0.81 0.79 0.31 0.19 0.63 0.13 0.06 0.50 0.25 0.75 0.35 0.94 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 7.13 5.75 5.81 18.69 0.32 3.83
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 5.00 5.50 17.00 0.28 3.73
French Legal Origin
Argentina 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0001 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 13 11 8 32 0.69 5.49
Belgium 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 10111 0.75 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 1001 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 5 3 5 13 0.17 3.17
Bolivia 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 n.a 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 0101 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 13 8 5 26 0.53 5.11
Brazil 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 1 1001 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 6 3 13 0.17 3.83
Chile 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 0110 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 8 9 5 22 0.42 4.79
Colombia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 0.33 10 17 5 32 0.69 3.94
Costa Rica 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 n.a 1 1 1 0.86 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0101 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 8 8 4 20 0.36 5.05
Cote D'Ivoire 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00011 0.50 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 1000 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 6 3 6 15 0.22 3.64
Dominican Republic 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0010 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 7 5 8 20 0.36 4.36
Ecuador 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 11111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0111 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 11 7 6 24 0.47 4.64
Egypt 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0 0011 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 4 2 6 12 0.14 3.60
El Salvador 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 11111 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 1 0111 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 6 3 4 13 0.17 4.25
France 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1000 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 4 1 4 9 0.06 3.60
Greece 1 1 1 1.00 1 n.a n.a 1 n.a 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 1100 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 1 0.67 4 3 5 12 0.14 4.31
Guatemala 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 0011 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 5 11 4 20 0.36 5.78
Honduras 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 1 n.a 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 1 1111 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 6 9 6 21 0.39 4.68
Indonesia 1 0 0 0.33 1 1 1 11101 0.88 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 0101 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 8 10 7 25 0.50 3.88
Italy 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 1000 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 4 1 6 11 0.11 4.24
Appendix 2A: Eviction of a tenant
This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows the professional vs. laymen, written vs. oral arguments, legal justification, and engagement formalities indices for the case of eviction of a tenant. A
variables are described in Table 1.
Control of superior review Engagement formalities Independent procedural actions Professionals vs. laymen Written vs. oral elements Legal justification Statutory regulation of evidenceFormalism index






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Control of superior review Engagement formalities Independent procedural actions Professionals vs. laymen Written vs. oral elements Legal justification Statutory regulation of evidence
Jordan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 01101 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 1 0101 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 0.33 9 9 10 28 0.58 3.38
Kuwait 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1001 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 5 3 4 12 0.14 4.60
Lebanon 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0011 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 9 11 6 26 0.53 5.57
Luxembourg 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 1 n.a 1 1 1 0.86 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 1001 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 6 7 5 18 0.31 3.66
Malta 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0011 0.38 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 3 2 5 10 0.08 3.42
Mexico 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 1 0011 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 14 12 9 35 0.78 4.82
Monaco 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 1001 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 1 1 0 0.67 4 2 3 9 0.06 2.93
Morocco 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 1111 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 5 4 4 13 0.17 4.79
Mozambique 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 6 8 6 20 0.36 5.15
Netherlands 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 1 0 0 0 0000 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 8 4 4 16 0.25 3.00
Netherlands Antilles 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0011 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 10 6 6 22 0.42 3.63
Panama 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0100 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 16 15 12 43 1.00 5.92
Paraguay 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 0 n.a 1 1 1 0.86 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 1101 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 10 10 9 29 0.61 5.09
Peru 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 10111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 1001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 9 9 7 25 0.50 5.42
Philippines 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0101 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0.67 13 7 5 25 0.50 5.00
Portugal 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 6 10 6 22 0.42 4.54
Senegal 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00111 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0111 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 8 4 6 18 0.31 3.89
Spain 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 01111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 1 0011 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 8 2 8 18 0.31 4.81
Tunisia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 01111 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 1 0010 0.25 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 6 3 6 15 0.22 3.89
Turkey 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00101 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 1 1101 0.75 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 10 6 7 23 0.44 3.49
Uruguay 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 00001 0.50 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0000 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 14 8 10 32 0.69 3.99
Venezuela 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0011 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 14 9 7 30 0.64 5.81
Mean 0.73 0.98 0.45 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.43 0.52 0.95 0.83 1.00 0.81 0.88 0.95 0.68 0.83 0.28 0.08 0.65 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.75 0.42 0.48 0.83 0.78 0.69 0.08 0.90 0.60 0.53 7.98 6.70 6.05 20.73 0.38 4.38
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 8.00 7.00 6.00 20.00 0.36 4.33
German Legal Origin
Austria 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 n.a 1 1 1 0.86 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0001 0.13 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 6 6 6 18 0.31 3.62
Germany 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 10111 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0 0011 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 6 9 6 21 0.39 3.76
Japan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 11111 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0001 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 3 5 12 0.14 3.72
Korea 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 01111 0.88 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0001 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 8 5 6 19 0.33 3.33
Switzerland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00111 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0001 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0.33 2 3 5 10 0.08 3.96
Taiwan 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 00111 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0001 0.38 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 6 3 13 0.17 3.04
Mean 0.83 1.00 0.00 0.61 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.67 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.27 0.50 1.00 0.67 0.72 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.11 5.00 5.33 5.17 15.50 0.24 3.57
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.50 5.50 15.50 0.24 3.67
Scandinavian Legal Origin
Denmark 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 1 1 0 0.67 1 0 0 0 0000 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 6 7 8 21 0.39 3.60
Finland 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 00101 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0 0001 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 6 1 4 11 0.11 2.53
Iceland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 00001 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0101 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0.33 5 2 2 9 0.06 3.47
Norway 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0 0000 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0.33 4 5 4 13 0.17 3.71
Sweden 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 00111 0.75 0 0 1 0.33 1 0 0 0 0001 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 9 6 3 18 0.31 3.31
Mean 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.60 1.00 0.63 0.40 0.80 0.80 0.67 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.23 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.13 6.00 4.20 4.20 14.40 0.21 3.32
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 13.00 0.17 3.47
Mean all countries 0.70 0.90 0.15 0.58 0.99 1.00 0.76 0.30 0.22 0.76 0.53 0.99 0.71 0.63 0.73 0.68 0.68 0.36 0.09 0.62 0.18 0.13 0.35 0.18 0.73 0.33 0.45 0.82 0.85 0.71 0.13 0.45 0.23 0.27 6.49 5.76 5.42 17.66 0.30 3.58
Median all countries 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 6.00 6.00 5.00 17.00 0.28 3.63
Tests of Means (t-stats)
Common vs. Socialist -3.24
a -1.76
c 0.00 -3.08
a 0.00 0.00 0.67 2.04
b 0.18 -3.12
a -2.87
a -0.61 -1.13 -0.68 -3.30
a -1.88
c -2.89
a 0.48 -0.95 0.84 -1.56 -1.64 -0.81 -2.89











Common vs. French -1.24 -2.20
b -5.79
a -4.34





















Common vs. German -1.12 -1.07 0.00 -1.31 2.84




b -0.65 -1.54 -2.18
b -2.29
b -0.55 -0.53 2.05
b 0.37 0.00 1.88
c -1.65 -1.34 0.50 -0.79 -1.34 1.66 -0.54 -0.15 0.81 0.54 0.70 0.73 -0.04 -0.34 0.22 0.22 -1.74
c
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.88 -0.98 0.00 -1.10 0.00 0.00 1.21 1.49 0.63 -1.17 -2.05
b -0.34 0.01 0.51 -1.27 -1.07 -0.98 -1.82
c 0.71 2.55
b 0.34 0.00 0.78 0.34 0.77 1.20 -1.17 -1.22 -0.71 -1.77
c -1.45 1.55 0.49 0.42 -0.30 0.91 1.01 0.72 0.72 -0.86
Socialist vs. French 2.42
b 0.63 -3.55





b -0.18 1.02 -0.57 0.28 1.22 -0.17 -2.37
b -2.25






a -0.94 -0.84 -0.42 -0.94 -0.94 -2.49
b
Socialist vs. German 1.71 0.00 0.00 1.71 1.71 0.00 0.37 -1.68 -1.96
c -0.60 -2.06
c 0.00 -1.68 -0.17 0.73 -1.12 -0.28 -0.79 0.11 1.21 0.88 0.60 2.34
b 0.40 -1.35 1.31 2.62
b 0.00 1.68 4.12
a -0.73 -0.73 0.60 -0.57 2.41
b 0.26 0.84 1.29 1.29 1.10
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 1.90
c 0.00 0.00 1.90
c 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.55 0.55 0.89 -0.14 0.00 0.65 0.86 0.89 0.06 0.80 -2.01
c 1.02 1.70 0.80 0.55 1.16 1.23 0.62 2.07
c 1.96
c 0.00 -0.55 1.36 -1.96
c 0.55 0.55 -0.76 1.24 0.88 1.70 1.57 1.57 1.93
c
French vs. German -0.55 -0.38 2.17b 0.98 2.77
a 0.00 0.25 0.42 0.47 -0.55 -1.10 0.00 0.35 1.32 1.07 -1.66 0.00 -1.11 -0.73 1.49 2.17
b 1.76
c 1.86
c 1.09 -1.38 1.81




b 0.84 1.05 1.56 1.56 2.37
b
French vs. Scandinavian -0.35 -0.35 1.98
c 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.53 1.88
c 2.24
b 1.26 1.18 0.00 2.44
b 2.78
a 1.26 -0.56 1.63 -2.45
b 0.62 1.98
c 1.98
c 1.60 0.76 1.78
c 0.70 2.23









German vs. Scandinavian 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.13 -0.90 0.00 0.21 1.43 1.63 1.11 1.81 0.00 1.48 0.83 0.13 1.11 1.06 -0.98 0.90 0.45 0.00 0.00 -1.11 0.90 1.81 0.59 -0.30 0.00 -1.43 -1.51 -0.81 0.90 . -0.21 -0.83 0.78 0.91 0.39 0.39 1.04
Tests of Medians (z-stats)
Common vs. Socialist -3.00
a -1.73
c 0.00 -3.08
a 0.00 0.00 0.68 1.99
b 0.19 -2.90
a -2.70
a -0.62 -1.51 -0.69 -3.04
a -1.84
c -2.81
a 0.48 -0.96 0.84 -1.54 -1.62 -0.82 -2.72






b 0.18 -1.58 -1.64 -1.64 -3.50
a
Common vs. French -1.23 -2.15
b -4.89
a -3.78




















Common vs. German -1.12 -1.07 0.00 -1.29 2.65




b -0.65 -1.52 -2.10
b -2.17
b -0.55 -0.53 1.98
b 0.38 0.00 1.83
c -1.62 -1.33 0.68 -0.79 -1.33 1.63 -0.47 -0.15 0.82 0.54 0.64 0.65 0.08 -0.66 0.20 0.20 -1.75
c
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.88 -0.98 0.00 -1.06 0.00 0.00 1.21 1.47 0.64 -1.16 -1.98
b -0.35 -0.30 0.52 -1.26 -1.07 -1.03 -1.77
c 0.71 2.41
b 0.35 0.00 0.79 0.35 0.78 1.45 -1.16 -1.22 -0.71 -1.79
c -1.43 1.52 0.49 0.33 -0.38 0.77 1.30 0.73 0.73 -0.85
Socialist vs. French 2.32
b 0.63 -3.23





b -0.19 1.02 -0.04 0.28 1.22 -0.17 -2.27
b -2.18






a -0.44 -0.92 -0.30 -0.73 -0.73 -2.45
b
Socialist vs. German 1.63 0.00 0.00 1.63 1.63 0.00 0.38 -1.61 -1.84
c -0.61 -1.92
c 0.00 -1.60 -0.18 0.74 -1.12 -0.21 -0.80 0.11 1.20 0.89 0.61 2.12
b 0.41 -1.32 1.27 2.32
b 0.00 1.61 3.10
a -0.74 -0.74 0.61 -0.99 2.10
b -0.11 0.60 1.14 1.14 0.88
Socialist vs. Scandinavian 1.79
c 0.00 0.00 1.79
c 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.89 -0.14 0.00 0.40 0.87 0.89 0.06 1.22 -1.88
c 1.02 1.62 0.81 0.56 1.15 1.21 0.63 1.95
c 1.84
c 0.00 -0.56 1.33 -1.84
c 0.56 0.56 -1.21 1.35 0.62 1.78
c 1.49 1.49 1.53
French vs. German -0.56 -0.39 2.08
b 1.07 2.58
a 0.00 0.26 0.42 0.47 -0.55 -1.10 0.00 0.38 1.31 1.07 -1.63 -0.21 -1.10 -0.73 1.47 2.08
b 1.72
c 1.81
c 1.09 -1.37 1.78




b 0.75 0.85 1.60 1.60 2.25
b
French vs. Scandinavian -0.35 -0.35 1.91
c 1.07 0.00 0.00 0.54 1.83
c 2.13
b 1.25 1.17 0.00 2.05
b 2.59
a 1.25 -0.56 1.62 -2.32
b 0.63 1.91
c 1.91
c 1.58 0.76 1.74
c 0.71 2.17









German vs. Scandinavian 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.14 -0.91 0.00 0.22 1.36 1.50 1.10 1.63 0.00 1.57 0.84 0.14 1.10 1.18 -0.98 0.91 0.47 0.00 0.00 -1.10 0.91 1.63 0.48 -0.32 0.00 -1.36 -1.42 -0.82 0.91 0.00 -0.22 -0.75 0.65 1.21 0.46 0.46 1.28
a=Significant at 1% level; b=Significant at 5% level; c=Significant at 10% level.
n.a.=Not applicable
.=MissingFormalism index








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Anguilla 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 2 5 14 0.13 1.96
Australia 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 n.a 0 n.a. 0 0 1 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 2 3 6 11 0.05 1.80
Bahrain 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 8 4 6 18 0.24 4.40
Bangladesh 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 6 3 6 15 0.16 3.24
Barbados 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 4 2 6 12 0.08 2.37
Belize 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 1 4 9 0.00 1.42
Bermuda 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 5 6 4 15 0.16 1.78
Botswana 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.75 1 0 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 0.67 6 7 7 20 0.29 4.08
BVI 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 4 1 8 13 0.11 2.52
Canada 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 3 5 9 17 0.21 2.09
Cayman 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 7 5 5 17 0.21 2.75
Cyprus 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 12 6 4 22 0.34 3.68
Ghana 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 7 5 9 21 0.32 2.65
Gibraltar 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0.75 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 8 1 7 16 0.18 2.39
Grenada 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 4 1 6 11 0.05 2.80
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.63 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 4 2 7 13 0.11 0.73
India 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 8 8 6 22 0.34 3.34
Ireland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 n.a. 0 0 1 0.57 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 8 4 7 19 0.26 2.63
Israel 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.88 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 6 7 6 19 0.26 3.30
Jamaica 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 3 4 11 0.05 2.34
Kenya 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 7 9 9 25 0.42 3.09
Malawi 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0.33 3 4 5 12 0.08 2.95
Malaysia 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 6 12 22 0.34 2.34
Namibia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 4 5 6 15 0.16 3.82
New Zealand 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 2 1 9 12 0.08 1.58
Nigeria 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 13 8 8 29 0.53 3.19
Pakistan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 12 12 6 30 0.55 3.76
Singapore 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0.33 7 7 6 20 0.29 2.50
South Africa 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 3 1 7 11 0.05 1.68
Sri Lanka 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 n.a. 1 0 1 0.86 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 3 6 17 0.21 3.78
St. Vincent 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 0 n.a. 0 0 0 0.43 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 5 4 6 15 0.16 3.63
Swaziland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 4 6 5 15 0.16 3.70
Tanzania 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 n.a. 1 0 1 0.86 1 1 0 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 6 3 5 14 0.13 3.82
Thailand 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 8 5 6 19 0.26 3.14
Trinidad & Tobago 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 7 4 8 19 0.26 1.80
Turks and Caicos 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 6 2 10 18 0.24 1.86
UAE 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 13 8 6 27 0.47 3.81
Uganda 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 1 n.a. 0 0 1 0.71 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 7 2 7 16 0.18 2.61
United Kingdom 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 n.a. 0 0 1 0.71 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.13 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 2 5 5 12 0.08 2.58
USA 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0 0 1 0.33 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 2 3 7 12 0.08 2.62
Zambia 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 0 n.a. 0 0 1 0.57 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 9 2 5 16 0.18 2.13
Zimbabwe 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 4 4 5 13 0.11 3.11
Mean 0.45 0.79 0.05 0.43 0.95 1.00 0.71 0.24 0.12 0.38 0.14 0.98 0.58 0.24 0.52 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.12 0.74 0.00 0.05 0.40 0.05 0.76 0.31 0.40 0.76 0.88 0.68 0.07 0.33 0.00 0.13 6.02 4.29 6.45 16.76 0.20 2.76
Median 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 4.00 6.00 16.00 0.18 2.64
Socialist Legal Origin
Bulgaria 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 7 8 11 26 0.45 4.57
China 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 10 3 7 20 0.29 3.41
Croatia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.25 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 8 6 6 20 0.29 3.62
Czech Republic 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 n.a. n.a. 1 0 1 0.83 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 7 4 5 16 0.18 4.06
Estonia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0.33 8 4 6 18 0.24 4.36
Georgia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 9 3 5 17 0.21 3.09
Hungary 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 6 5 6 17 0.21 3.42
Kazakhstan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0.33 12 17 12 41 0.84 4.76
Latvia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 9 2 8 19 0.26 3.93
Lithuania 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 16 3 11 30 0.55 4.47
Poland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 5 5 18 0.24 4.15
Romania 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 6 14 28 0.50 4.42
Russia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 3 5 16 0.18 3.39
Slovenia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 8 4 10 22 0.34 4.26
Ukraine 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 10 3 7 20 0.29 3.66
Vietnam 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 13 6 9 28 0.50 3.25
Mean 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.13 0.07 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.72 0.56 1.00 0.81 0.79 0.31 0.19 0.56 0.13 0.19 0.63 0.25 0.75 0.38 0.94 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 9.19 5.13 7.94 22.25 0.35 3.93
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.00 4.00 7.00 20.00 0.29 3.99
French Legal Origin
Argentina 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 n.a. 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 16 5 11 32 0.61 5.40
Belgium 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 5 4 7 16 0.18 2.73
Bolivia 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 18 11 7 36 0.71 5.75
Brazil 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.38 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 7 5 16 0.18 3.06
Chile 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 10 8 3 21 0.32 4.57
Colombia 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 0.33 14 14 9 37 0.74 4.11
Costa Rica 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 8 9 4 21 0.32 5.48
Cote D'Ivoire 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 6 3 9 18 0.24 3.65
Dominican Republic 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 7 5 8 20 0.29 4.08
Control of superior review Engagement formalities Independent procedural actions
Appendix 2B : Collection of a check
This table classifies countries by legal origin and shows the professional vs. laymen, written vs. oral arguments, legal justification, and Engagement formalities indices for the case of collection
of a check. All variables are described in Table 1.
Professionals vs. Laymen Written vs. oral elements Legal justification Statutory regulation of evidenceFormalism index







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Control of superior review Engagement formalities Independent procedural actions Professionals vs. Laymen Written vs. oral elements Legal justification Statutory regulation of evidence
Ecuador 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 14 12 7 33 0.63 4.92
Egypt 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 0.33 6 2 9 17 0.21 3.79
El Salvador 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.88 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 8 4 4 16 0.18 4.60
France 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.13 0 0 1 0.33 0 1 1 0.67 3 1 6 10 0.03 3.23
Greece 1 1 0 0.67 1 n.a. n.a. 1 n.a. 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 1 0.67 5 3 7 15 0.16 3.99
Guatemala 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 8 5 6 19 0.26 5.68
Honduras 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 13 12 7 32 0.61 4.90
Indonesia 1 0 0 0.33 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.88 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 11 10 8 29 0.53 3.90
Italy 0 1 1 0.67 1 n.a. 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.86 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 5 6 5 16 0.18 4.04
Jordan 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 0 0 0.00 0 1 0 0.33 12 9 11 32 0.61 3.52
Kuwait 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 9 3 5 17 0.21 3.88
Lebanon 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.75 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 8 11 8 27 0.47 4.85
Luxembourg 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 n.a. 1 1 1 0.71 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 5 9 8 22 0.34 3.56
Malta 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.38 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 6 2 5 13 0.11 2.44
Mexico 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 15 16 16 47 1.00 4.71
Monaco 0 1 0 0.33 1 n.a. 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.71 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.25 0 0 1 0.33 1 1 0 0.67 7 2 4 13 0.11 2.74
Morocco 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 9 4 4 17 0.21 4.71
Mozambique 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.50 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 4 7 7 18 0.24 4.49
Netherlands 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.63 1 1 0 0.67 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 11 4 6 21 0.32 3.07
Netherlands Antilles 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.88 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.25 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 8 7 9 24 0.39 2.85
Panama 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.25 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 18 11 15 44 0.92 5.84
Paraguay 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 n.a. 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.63 1 0 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 20 13 12 45 0.95 5.91
Peru 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 14 9 12 35 0.68 5.60
Philippines 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 0.67 13 7 8 28 0.50 5.00
Portugal 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.50 1 0 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 5 9 8 22 0.34 3.93
Senegal 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0.88 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 13 8 9 30 0.55 4.72
Spain 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 9 5 6 20 0.29 5.25
Tunisia 1 1 0 0.67 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.25 1 1 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 4 1 9 14 0.13 4.05
Turkey 0 0 0 0.00 1 1 1 1 n.a. 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0.67 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 0 0 0.00 0 0 0 0.00 9 4 5 18 0.24 2.53
Uruguay 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.50 1 1 0 0.67 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 16 8 14 38 0.76 4.05
Venezuela 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1 n.a. 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 1 1.00 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.50 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 1 0.67 20 9 12 41 0.84 6.01
Mean 0.70 0.93 0.43 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.54 0.67 0.93 0.83 1.00 0.85 0.85 0.95 0.60 0.80 0.28 0.08 0.65 0.45 0.28 0.43 0.43 0.75 0.42 0.43 0.73 0.75 0.63 0.10 0.85 0.53 0.49 9.90 6.98 7.88 24.75 0.41 4.29
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 9.00 7.00 7.50 21.00 0.32 4.10
German Legal Origin
Austria 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 n.a. 1 1 1 0.86 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.38 1 0 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 6 6 8 20 0.29 3.52
Germany 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.88 1 1 1 1.00 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 4 3 7 14 0.13 3.51
Japan 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.88 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 8 3 5 16 0.18 2.98
Korea 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.88 0 0 1 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.13 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 0 0.33 11 5 7 23 0.37 3.37
Switzerland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 0 1 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 4 4 6 14 0.13 3.13
Taiwan 0 1 0 0.33 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.50 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38 0 1 0 0.33 0 0 0 0.00 4 6 5 15 0.16 2.37
Mean 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.83 1.00 0.67 0.33 0.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.77 0.33 0.83 1.00 0.72 0.67 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.33 0.17 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.11 6.17 4.50 6.33 17.00 0.21 3.15
Median 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 4.50 6.50 15.50 0.17 3.25
Scandinavian Legal Origin
Denmark 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 0 0 0.00 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 4 0 10 14 0.13 2.55
Finland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 10 2 7 19 0.26 3.14
Iceland 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.63 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.38 1 1 1 1.00 0 1 0 0.33 6 3 5 14 0.13 4.13
Norway 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0 1 1 0.67 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 1 1 1 1.00 0 0 0 0.00 5 3 4 12 0.08 2.95
Sweden 1 1 0 0.67 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.75 0 0 1 0.33 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.25 0 1 1 0.67 0 0 0 0.00 11 6 4 21 0.32 2.98
Mean 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.40 1.00 0.68 0.20 0.60 0.80 0.53 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.23 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.13 7.20 2.80 6.00 16.00 0.18 3.15
Median 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00 3.00 5.00 14.00 0.13 2.98
Mean all countries 0.63 0.89 0.17 0.57 0.97 1.00 0.76 0.34 0.30 0.73 0.52 0.99 0.71 0.51 0.77 0.62 0.64 0.36 0.11 0.63 0.18 0.16 0.42 0.22 0.76 0.36 0.49 0.79 0.83 0.70 0.07 0.49 0.20 0.25 7.97 5.34 7.17 20.48 0.30 3.53
Median all countries 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 7.00 5.00 7.00 18.00 0.24 3.52
Tests of Means (t-stats)
Common vs. Socialist -4.32
a -2.05
b 0.88 -3.29






a 0.31 -0.67 1.29 -2.41
b -1.71
c -1.51 -2.33




b -1.64 1.45 -3.84





























Common vs. German -0.21 -1.25 0.54 -0.59 1.12 0.00 0.20 -0.49 -0.50 -3.06
a -5.87
a -0.37 -2.73
a -0.49 -1.43 -2.40
b -2.25
b -1.45 -0.32 2.05
b 0.00 -1.12 1.12 -1.12 -1.34 -0.37 1.12 0.49 1.39 1.84
c 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.30 -0.11 -0.20 0.16 -0.11 -0.11 -1.12
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.61 -1.14 0.49 -0.79 -0.49 0.00 -0.43 0.19 0.80 -2.79
a -1.45 -0.34 -1.35 0.19 -0.32 -1.27 -0.75 -1.94
c 0.80 2.55
b 0.00 0.49 0.88 0.49 0.77 1.22 -0.82 -1.22 -0.80 -1.70
c 0.61 -0.29 0.00 0.02 -0.85 1.25 0.53 0.33 0.33 -1.03
Socialist vs. French 2.57
b 1.12 -3.38
a -0.21 0.00 0.00 0.73 -2.84
a -4.55
a 1.12 -1.61 0.00 -3.05
a -2.38b 0.90 1.52 -0.12 0.28 1.22 -0.60 -2.37







c 0.07 -0.92 -0.92 -1.36
Socialist vs. German 3.81
a 0.00 0.00 3.81
a 1.71 0.00 1.11 -1.03 -0.83 0.00 -1.81
c 0.00 -0.73 0.93 1.71 -1.12 0.55 -1.51 0.11 0.93 0.88 0.11 2.00
c 0.40 -1.35 0.67 5.41
a 2.70
b 1.68 7.13
a 0.60 -1.68 0.60 -0.70 2.39




Socialist vs. Scandinavian 3.11
a 0.00 0.00 3.11
a 0.00 0.00 0.40 -0.34 0.57 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.93 1.42 3.11
a 0.06 1.71 -2.01
c 1.02 1.42 0.80 1.02 1.70 1.23 0.62 2.35
b 1.96
c 0.00 -0.55 1.36 0.55 -1.96




French vs. German 0.96 -0.68 2.06
b 1.40 2.77
a 0.00 0.66 0.92 2.05
b -0.68 -1.10 0.00 1.24 3.09a 1.07 -1.96
c 0.78 -1.95
c -0.73 1.49 2.17








French vs. Scandinavian 0.45 -0.62 1.88








c 1.35 0.96 1.88
c 0.70 2.05








German vs. Scandinavian -0.30 0.00 0.00 -0.30 -0.90 0.00 -0.45 0.45 1.00 0.00 2.71
b 0.00 1.17 0.45 0.81 1.11 0.99 -0.45 0.90 0.45 0.00 0.90 -0.13 0.90 1.81 1.51 -1.51 -1.43 -1.43 -3.32
a 0.00 -0.21 0.00 -0.21 -0.57 1.58 0.29 0.44 0.44 -0.02
Tests of Medians (z-stats)
Common vs. Socialist -3.78
a -2.00
b 0.88 -3.27







a 0.32 -0.67 1.28 -2.31
b -1.68
c -1.49 -2.24




b -1.62 1.42 -3.82






























Common vs. German -0.22 -1.24 0.54 -0.55 1.12 0.00 0.20 -0.50 -0.51 -2.82
a -4.49
a -0.38 -2.40
b -0.50 -1.41 -2.29
b -2.15
b -1.44 -0.33 1.98
b 0.00 -1.12 1.12 -1.12 -1.33 -0.47 1.12 0.50 1.38 1.95
c 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.26 -0.11 -0.50 -0.08 -0.38 -0.38 -1.09
Common vs. Scandinavian -0.62 -1.14 0.49 -0.79 -0.49 0.00 -0.43 0.19 0.80 -2.60
a -1.43 -0.35 -1.54 0.19 -0.32 -1.26 -0.74 -1.89
c 0.81 2.41
b 0.00 0.49 0.88 0.49 0.78 1.39 -0.83 -1.22 -0.81 -1.75
c 0.61 -0.29 0.00 -0.04 -0.78 1.18 0.81 0.17 0.17 -1.02
Socialist vs. French 2.45
b 1.12 -3.10
a -0.63 0.00 0.00 0.73 -2.67
a -3.82
a 1.12 -1.59 0.00 -2.82
a -2.28
b 0.90 1.50 0.08 0.28 1.22 -0.61 -2.27







c 0.05 -0.55 -0.55 -1.29
Socialist vs. German 2.97
a 0.00 0.00 2.97
a 1.63 0.00 1.10 -1.03 -0.84 0.00 -1.72
c 0.00 -1.16 0.94 1.63 -1.12 0.68 -1.47 0.11 0.94 0.89 0.11 1.87
c 0.41 -1.32 0.58 3.53
a 2.37
b 1.61 3.88
a 0.61 -1.61 0.61 -0.71 2.14




Socialist vs. Scandinavian 2.60
a 0.00 0.00 2.60
a 0.00 0.00 0.41 -0.35 0.58 0.00 0.87 0.00 1.26 1.38 2.60
a 0.06 1.51 -1.88
c 1.02 1.38 0.81 1.02 1.62 1.21 0.63 2.14
b 1.84
c . -0.56 1.33 0.56 -1.84





French vs. German 0.96 -0.69 1.99
b 1.55 2.58
a 0.00 0.66 0.93 1.96
b -0.69 -1.10 0.00 1.26 2.83
a 1.07 -1.90
c 0.79 -1.89
c -0.73 1.47 2.08








French vs. Scandinavian 0.45 -0.63 1.83









c 1.33 0.96 1.83
c 0.71 2.07









German vs. Scandinavian -0.32 0.00 0.00 -0.32 -0.91 0.00 -0.47 0.47 1.00 0.00 2.12
b 0.00 1.23 0.47 0.82 1.10 0.87 -0.47 0.91 0.47 0.00 0.91 -0.14 0.91 1.63 1.43 -1.42 -1.36 -1.36 -2.35
b 0.00 -0.22 0.00 -0.22 -0.66 1.51 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.37
a=Significant at 1% level; b=Significant at 5% level; c=Significant at 10% level.
n.a.=Not applicable
.=Missing